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The last two decades in Sudan have witnessed the emergence and
subsequent expansion of an active parallel economy.  The parallel economic
activities have been primarily concentrated in the foreign sector of the
economy in the form of:  mis-invoicing and smuggling of exports and imports,
and diversion of remittances from Sudanese nationals working abroad to the
black market for foreign exchange.  The portfolio and flow transaction. in
foreign exchange were settled in this market at a freely determined rate.  The
floating black market rate have co-existed with an official system of fixed
exchange rates, exchange controls, and varying degrees of import rationing.  A
brief view of exchange rates in Sudan is provided in appendix table  (A.1).
The long term average evolution of the premium (black market rate over the
official) during 1970-1989 is given in annual data in graph (1).  The premium
which reflects the behavior of the free rate in addition to official policy,
including devaluation, has averaged above 170 percent for the sub-period 1970-
1987 and over 500 percent for the remaining three years.'
BecauL` sof  the large size of  foreign exchange traded in the black
market2  and tj  .2  extent of the rationed demand for imports, the black market
rate is in fact the marginal price for imports and for foreign exchange.
Furthermore, its rate of change reflects the opportunity cost of holding
domestic currency vis-a-vis holding of foreign exchange or other forms of
'Table  (A.1) and graph (1) do not contain the premium with respect to the
fixed dual rate which is not available on annual basis.  A broader view of the
exchange rate system is provided in table (1)  of the following section.
2The  size of just one source of foreign exchange for the black market (the
non-official  remittance  by Sudanese  nationals working abroad), averaged  more  than
one billion dollars per annum throughout the 80's (see table (3) below).-2
durable  assets. Therefore  the  black  market  iJs  strongly  linsed  to the  reut  of
the  macroeconomy  and  th6 (endogenous)  black  market  premium  is considered  to be
an important  macroeconomic  indicator  reflecting  the inconsistency  between
macroeconomic  policy  and  the  foreign  trade  and  exchange  rate  regime;  and  theu
it's  likely  to  affect  private  sector  behavior  such  as  expectations  of  future
devaluation  as well  as  government  policy  reaction. de Macedo  (1985)  for
example  argued  that  the importance  of the  black  market  for macroeconomic
management  in  Sudan  during  the  period,  derives  from  the role played  by the
premium  as  a relative  price  signal  fir  lack  of credibility  on the part  of
government  policies  or economic  reform. The above  description  fits  the
example  of  many countries  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa  that have experienced
deteriorating  economic  conditions  during  the  80s,  and in  most cases  aborted  or
incredible  attempts  at economic  reform  as well,  e.g.  Pinto (1987).
In a survey  of exchange  rate  regimes  in SSA,  Pinto  and van  Wijnbergen
(1987)  argued  that  black  market  and  dual  regimes  are  not  only common in
Africa,  "but  a key  insight  is  that  part of the  current  macroeconomic
instability  in SSA  may be due to a failure  to adjust  policy for  the existence
of parallel  markets."3  According  to this literature  therefore,  successful  and
sustainable  unification  of the  black  market  rate  with  the official  should  be a
prime  objective  of economic  reforms  in  those  countries,  Sudan  included. In
addition  to the  often  cited  efficiency  costs  associated  with the  dual regime,
a  high  and  persistent  black  market  premium  can  substantially  undermine  the
allocational  role  of  the  real  exchange  rate  in  the  economy  by  exposing  the
credibility  problem  of  macroeconomic  policy.  Even  under  the  unlikely  scenario
3This  notion  has  been  formalized  and  elaborated  upon  in  a  series  of  papers
by  Pinto  (e.g.  Pinto  (1986,  1987,  1988b)).-3-
of a depreciated  black  market  rats  leading  to real  depreciation  in the  export
sector  for  example,'  it  does not  necessarily  followl  that investment  and  other
resource  flows  into  this  sector  will be enhanced. mnis  is because  of the
increased  business  risk  created  by the perceived  declining  credibility  of
policy. 5
Exchange  rate  unification  however,  requires  explicit  consideration  of
the  endogeniety  of the  premium,  and  the  order  of sequencing  or the primacy  of
the  policy  instruments  to be deployed  in  the  reform  program. More precisely
the  work  of Pinto (oo.cit.)  argued  for  the  primacy  of fiscal  policy  and  the
need  to design  the  pace  of exchange  rate  policy  to be consistent  with fiscal
reform. The  driving  idea  behind  thie  prescription  is  that:  if  the fiscal
deficit  is  not sufficiently  reduced,  premature  policy  of an accel.rated  crawl
for  example,  when  the  public  sector  is a net  buyer  of foreign  exchanges  could
lead  to unsustainable  post  unification  inflation  as  the authorities  find
themselves  forced  to rely  exclusively  on higher  inflation  tax in order  to
replace  foregone  implicit  revenue  derived  from  the  taxation  of exports  through
the  premium.
Along  the lines  of the above  dLcupsion we will study  in this  paper  the
macroeconomic  implication  of the  black  market  for  foreign  exchange  and  the
extent  to  which  the  presence  of such  a sizeable  market  interfere  with
macroeconomic  management  in  Sudan. The  main thesis  of this paper is  that
successful  exchange  rate  unification  and subsequent  integration  of the
'Devarajan  and  Weiner  (1990) developed a  model  that  predicts real
appreciation  as  a  result  of  a  rising  premium  even  if  exports  are  sold  at  the  free
rate  provided  that  the  marginal  cost  of labor  is determined  at the free  market.
'This effects is  what  Pinto  (1987b) referred to  as  "reducing the
informational  content  of the real  exchange  rate."parallel  market  into  the  regular  economy  will require  a strong  commitment  to
fiscal  retrenchment  an  well as a gradual  pace of exchange  rate  unification  and
foreigx.  trade  liberalization  tailored  to the  pace of fiscal  reform. While
this  finding  is  broadly  consonant  with  the  evidence  obtained  for  other  Sub-
Saharan  African  countries,  e.g.  Pinto  (op.cit.);  our  results  show  that  what  is
relevant  for  explaining  the  evolution  of  the  premium  for  given  levels  of
fiscal  deficit  and  trade  policy,  is  agents'  expectations  of future  devaluation
and  not just  the  actual  exchange  rate  policy  being  implementsd.
Another  point  of departure  from  previous  analysie  (as  shown  by our
results  in  Section  IV.l  of this  paper)  is  t;;at  the  potential  trade-off  between
the  inflation  tax  and  the implicit  tax  via  the premium  is not  automatic  or
necessarily  significant  depending  on the  extent  to which  the accompanying
trade  and  exchange  rate liberalization  policies  - for  example  through  its
influence  on the premium  - expand  the  tax  base on foreign  trade  and  other
transactions  on the "legalized"  free  foreign  exchange  market.
Sect_  o4n  II  of this  paper  provides  an overview  of major macroeconomic
development  and  the evolution  of  policies  in the areas  of exchange  rate and
foreign  trade.  A detailed  discussion  of the  motives  and  causes  behind  the
official  policies  deployed  in the  areas  of foreign  trade  and  payment  regime  is
provided  in appendix  I  to this  paper. The structure  of the fcreign  exchange
market  will  be described  and  analyzed  in section  III.  In section  IV,  I  will
employ  a simple  model  of the  dual  exchange  rate  to study  the  macroeconomic  and
foreign  trade  determinants  of the  black  market  premium. This framework  will
be  used  to study  the interactions  between  the  premium  and other  major
macroeconomic  indicatcrs,  including  an econometric  analysis  of the premium
effects  on key  macroeconomic  variables. A more rigorous  level  of analysis  ofthe  flow  and  asset  market  determinants  of  the  premium  will  be  conducted  in
section  V based  on an  empirical  forwa lI looking  model  of the black  market
premium. Finally  section  VI draws  some implications  of the  paper's  findings
for  economic  reform  and  adjustment  in Sudan.-6-
11.  AN  OVERVIEW  OF  EXCHNGE  RATT AND FOREIGN TRADE REFORM:  IS70-1990.
Sudan,  the largest  countrv  in  Africa,  has  experienced  sharply  declining
economic  fortunes  since  prior  to  the end  of the seventies  decade  to the
present. Despite  its  enormous  natural  resource  bass  and relatively  skilled
labor  force,  the  country  could  only  manage  to achieve  a growth  rate of  2.9
percent  per  annum  for  the  FY1976-89  period  and  with  its  high  population  growth
this  amounts  to  an  11  percent  reduction  in  real  per  capita  income  over  the
last  14  years.  According  to  a  recent  World  Bank  study  Sudan's  exports  fell  by
1.4  percent  a year  over  the 80's  leading  to a decline  in the  country's  share
of merchandise  exports  by 46 percent  over  the  decade. Domestic  saving  on the
other  hand  fell from  13  percent  of  GDP in FY 1976  to an average  of only  4
percent  over the  80's.
The inadequate  domestic  saving  required  reliance  on external  borrowing
and  resource  to domestic  credit  expansion  !or  the finance  of the  ambitious
development  program  that  spanned  the second  half  of the 70's  and the early
80's.  As a result,  Sudan  outstanding  external  debt  reached  USS 6 billion  in
1984  and is  currently  estimated  at US$ 13.9  billion  about  60 percent  of which
is  expected  to be in  the form  of arrears. As further  external  financing
became  difficult,  public  expenditure  had  to be curtailed  with the brunt  of the
cuts  borne  by public  spending  on investment,  Imports,  and human  and social
sectors.  Consequently  the high  investment  (  22  percent  of GDP )  rates  achieved
up  to the  early  80's  declined  to less  than 10  percent  of GDP in FY1989  and  is
expected  to  go down  even further  for  the  current  fiscal  year.
Sudan  had  more  than its  share  of political  instability  with the-7-
lingering  civil  war becoming  increasingly  costly. 6 It has  also  recently
experienced  advers  exogenous  shocks  in  terna  of  severe  droughts  during  1982-
S5  and  flood  and locust  in 1989. It is  generally  agreed  however,  that  the
poor  economic  performance  of  Sudan  remains  by  aad large  a  legacy  of  a  long
history  of  domestic  economic  policy  mistakes.  The  70s  decade  marked  the
beginning  of  at  era  characterized  by  expansive  macroeccnomic  policies  aimed  at
supporting  a  massive  economic  development  program.  With  government  revenues
barely  mseting  current  exponditure  and  no  financial  markets  available,  the
authorities  relied  heav.ly  an  currency  issue  and  external  financing.  For
example  broad  money  supply  increaued  from  LS 2.8  million  in 1970/71  to  a
staggering  LS  877  million  in 1978/79.
on the  other  hand,  Sudanese  foreign  trade  and  payment  regime ias  been
one  of full  exchange  control  and  highly  regulated  current  account  transactions
since  prior  to the  country's  independence  Ln 1956.  Also the  exchange  rate  was
fixed  at LS 0.35/USS. Clearly  this  arrangement  was not  consistent  with  the
expansive  macroeconomic  policies  of the 703  and the  other  exogenous  shocks  of
the  oil  price  hikes  of the  mid  703  and its  aftermath. In an attempt to limit
the  adverse  inflationary  and  appreciationary  consequences  of these  policies-
particularly  for  the  foreign  sector,  the authorities  introduced  a  dual
exchange  rate  system  and  special  foreign  trade  schemes  as early  as the second
half  of the  70's  decade. The  authorities  however,  have  relied  primarily  on
for 'tn  trade  and  other  economy  wide controls  in order  to suppress  excess
aggregate  demand. The  limited  exchange  rate  and foreign  trade  reforms  could
not  keep  pace  with the  vastly  deteriorating  macroeconomic  conditions,  and the
'Since  ito independence  in 1956,  Sudan  has experienced  a civil  war in its
Southern  region  except  for  12  years  (1972-1983)  during  which  a peace  agreement
was  in effect.*laborate  ensemble  of economic  controls  achieved  nothing  but  to pave  the  way
or the  development  of a sizabl(i  parallel  economy,  (for  more details  see
ap2endix S).
The  conditions  of highly  rationad  demand  for imports  constituted  a
etrong  current  account  link  for  the  black  mar)it for  forexgn  exchange. After
1973  Sudan  developed  into  a major  labor  exporting  country  with the remittances
sent  by  Sudanese  nationals  working  abroad  (SNWA) accounting  for  more  than  3
times  the  foreign  exchange  earnings  out  of  exports.  This  provided  for  an
enormous  source  of supply  of foreign  exchange  for  the black  market. Actually
the  go - of enhancing  the share  of SNWA  remittances  channelled  through  the
official  market  became  the  most important  determinant  of exchange  rate and
foreign  trade  policy. This  policy  which  also  aimed  at segmenting  SNWA
remittances  from  the  rest  of the  economy  did not succeed  however. Despite  a
smaller  spread  of the  free  rate  over  the  dual (compared  to the free/official
premium),  such  premium  averaged  close  to 140  percent  (see  table  1),  and  it
appeared  to  be enough  to cause  a significant  share  of SNWA remittaneas  to flow
through  the  black  market,  see  section  III  below.  Also the  presence  of
informal off-shore"  markets  in  the  major  receiving  countries  of Sudanese
migrant  workers  rendered  domestic  enforcement  efforts  of exchange  control
ineffective.
The large  capital  inflows  and  excessive  monetary  expansion  that
permitted  the  massive  spending  spree  during  the second  half  of the 70's  have
created  substantial  real  appreciation  and  thus facilitated  the  expansion  of
the  black  market  and  the  economy  started  to  assume  crisis  proportions.  By
September  1979  an agreement  with  the IMF  was concluded. This  will  mark the
beginning  of a series  of an IMF  style  stabilization  and liberalization-9-
programs that dominated virtually all of the 80's decade.  Apart from the
merits of the liberalization strategy, the experiment was surrounded with
considerable confusion due to the extensive and often contradicting policiea
isuued by the authorities during this period.  In the words of  Umbacda (1986),
"It is rather difficult, if not impossible, to trace all the developments that
took place during the period 1979-1986 in the trade and payment regime.  The
country looked more like an experimental laboratory than a real life country.
During the period, the Bank of Sudan alone issued more than (400) circular.,
regulating movements of payment and commodities between the official, the
parallel and .he free  market."
The major episodes are recorded in table 1; also a detailed description
is provided in the appendix.  At any rate, the central policies emphasized by
the package are twofold: successive devaluation and continuous shifting of
imports (and  to some extent exporta) from the official market to the
"legalized "  free parallel market.  This way, it was envisaged that exchange
rate unification will ultimately be achieved and the parallel market will be
integrated into the regular economy or perhaps squeezed to just a 'side  show'.
Unfortunately the quest for liberalization in Sudan has been a dismal failure,
and the black market continued to expand as economic conditions deteriorated
even  further  as  indicated  above.  With  unsustainable  macroeconomic  policies,
the  experiment  has  widely  exposed  the  credibility  problem  of  the  government,
thus rekindling expectations and widening the parallel market.  After a decade
of liberalization attempts, Sudan now has moved full circle back to total
import bans and exchange control enforced by harsh measures including the
death penalty.- 10  -
111.  TE  FOREIGN  EZXCHaNS  MARKET  IN SUDAN
The  previous  section  provided  a brief  review  of the policies  involved  in
the  area.  of foreign  trade  and  payment  regime. In  this section  we discuss  the
structure  of the foreign  exchange  market  and its  current  account links  to SNWA
remittances  and  the  market  for  goods  and  services. An  analysis  of the
structure  of  the foreign  exchange  market  that assesses  the extent  of its
competitiveness  and  the  nature  of its  sources  and  uses,  is essential  for
subsequent  analysis  that formalizes  the interaction  between  this  market  and
the  ma-roeconomy  and  for  the  design  of policies  aimed  at improving  resource
allocation  through  macroeconomic  management. GLven  the importance  of the
black  market  in Sudan,  the  black  market  premium  becomes  an indicator  with
important  macroeconomic  significance.  A  formal  assessment  of  this  link  to  the
macroeconomy  will  be addressed  in the  next  two sections.
in  the last  part  of this section  I  will  analyze  the statistical
characteristics  of the  premium (and  the free  rate)  and  their non-economic
determinants  such  as seasonal  factors  and  bubbles. As we saw from the
previous  section,  trading  in foreign  exchange  (be  legalized  or not, inside  the
country  or in  the  off-shore  markets)  has  basically  continued  unimpeded  for
most  of  the  last  two  decades,  even  though  it  was  only  after  the  IMF inspired
liberalization  of  September  1979  that  the  market  expanded  rapidly  to  become  a
major  sector  in  the  economy. We will  therefore  interchangeably  use  "black"  or
"free"  to refer  to the same  thing.
1.  The  Structure  of  the  Market
The free  foreign  exchange  market  in Sudan  is  composed  of two main
channels:  the  private  and public  commercial  banks,  and  the private licensed- 11  -
and unlicensed dealers.  Actually the commercial banks, being subjected to the
government imposed maximum selling and buying rates (see table 1),  were in
fact operating on a managed or a moving peg environment.  The main supply of
foreign exchange through the banking system is provided by the proceeds from
nontraditional exports.  As for SNWA remittances, the main primary source of
foreign exchange;'  an average of about only 20 percent is believed to flow
through the official channels (which includes the banking system), thus
leaving the private dealers with about 80 percent of the sizable SNWA
remittances.
The licensed dealers who normally have established business ties
including access to banks and non-banks credit, work closely with a larger
number of unlicensed dealers.  Each licensed dealer would have an "army' of
such unlicensed dealers who either work as middle men between the licensed
dealer and the holders of SNWA foreign exchange, or they may simply be working
for the dealer to hunt for sellers through their direct "street" persuasion.
The selling side of the trading activities of the licensed dealers was also
frequently mediated by another set of dealers.
The rationality of such arrangements is explained by two accounts: first
it  may reflect a relative lack of information on the part of primary
suppliers, and second it may be consistent with a rational risk averse
behavior on the part of sellers and buyers in the market especially after the
authorities attempt more aggressive measures at enforcing regulations, USAID-
Sudan(1985). According to the USAID study 70 percent of the foreign exchange
supplied by the primary source is received by the licensed private dealers
'For example the size of total SNWA remittances is estimated  to average
$1.6 billion per annum for the 1980/81 to 1988/89 period, (see table (2)).- 12 -
through the unlicensed street dealers.  The customers of licensed dealers are
mostly  foreign firms, private business, commercial banks, ant.  -ome government
entities.  Also according to the above study about 60 percent of the demand
for these customers was satisfied through middlemen.  Under non-normal
conditions when the auth.rities attempt at enforcing a maximum rate for
example or when the market is tight, the "trusted group" of middlemen- who
usually tend to have the trust of the two parties- were believed to have
mediated as high as 95 percent of the foreign exchange sales to end users.
The structure of the free  market by currency composition shows a large
share for the dollar averaging more than 70 percent for the buying
transactions and more than 80 percent for the selling transactions.  The other
major currency the Saudi Rayal comes as a distant second.  In terms of firms
concentration the number of authorized dealers during legalization was large
and was inc.easing especially during 1984, and meny of them had a very small
share of the market.$
The homogenous product (the  dollar) and the relatively lenient
conditions set for entry and exit from the market  (when it was legal) may
explain the above evidence.  The foreign exchange market however, is still
judged not to be fully competitive.  While dealers tend to be well informed
about market conditions (using  telephone communications among themselves), the
large number of small primary suppliers and some of the end users were usually
not so informed.  This is a factor that explains the observed discrepancies  in
the daily prices.  As we noted above the lack of full market information also
I  de Macedo  (1985)  computed a measure of concentration based on Herfindhal
index for  1984  equal  to  5.6.  In comparing  this  finding  to  other  similar
computations obtained for U.S.  auto firma (e.g.  Dixit (1985)), he concluded that
this shows a degree of competition In Sudan foreign exchange market far greater
than generally believed.- 13 -
partially explains the reliance on "street dealers" by the more established
traders in the market.  The market also may sometimes  "lapse into a buying
oligopsony and selling monopoly" because of the seasonality that characterize
supply and demand and also because some dealers have relatively larger share
than others.  The market however is generally viewed to have been competitive
enough to ensure the uniformity of the quoted rates among dealers, de Macedo
(1985), and USAID (1985).
2.  The Current Account Link, Capital Flight, and the Role of SNWA
Remittances
Table 2 shows the importance of SNWA remittance as a  source of foreign
exchange as compared to other relevant indicators in the economy such as
exports, imports, and GDP.  Even though the size of remittances transferred
through the official channels comprised only about 20 percent of the total, it
has an average ratio of 48 percent with respect to commodity exports,23.4
percent with respect to imports, and 4.2 percent with respect to GDP since
1980/81.  This leave the rest of SNWA remittances  (about 80 percent of total)
to be available to meet the flow and asset demand for foreign exchange through
the free foreign exchange market, (table 2).  As shown in table 3, the share
of imports financed through the free market has been high even before the
September 1979 liberalization.  After legalization of the free market in 1981
this share have averaged 39.4 percent of total imports.9
It can also be seen from the table that the size if the remittance flows
to the free market tend to be consistently larger than the value of imports
9If  the  years 1985/86 and 1986/87  were excluded this share will rise to 52.5
percent.- 14 -
financed  through  this  market. The  ultimate  private  or unreported  current
account  surplus  may be smaller  than  what  may be obtained  from  table  3 since
other  flow  demands  such  as tourism,  education  are in fact financed  through
this  market  as  well.  The  data on  table (3)  on the other  hand  understates  the
true supply  for  the free  market  since  there  are  other  potential  sources  such
an  mis-invoicing  and smuggling  of exports  and imports. Despite  ohe
possibility  of market  thinness  at  times  of hligh  seasonal  demand  or when
liberal  import  policies  were pursued,  the  general  view is that  there  were  more
frequent  surpluses  than  not in  the  private  current  account  in  Sudan.  This
story  is also  consistent  with  our  estimates  of capital  flight  contained  in
table (4). The  methodology  for  computing  the  capital  flight  estimates  is
based  on Dornbusch  (1985)  and is  adapted  to account  for  SNWA flows  through  the
unofficial  market  and  the own funds  imports. See  appendix  II for  a
description.
The ratios  of capital  flight  (column  (1))  to the  change  in  the stock  of
debt  and  to GDP are  shown  in  columns  (2)  and (3)  of table (4). Even  when
using  our  more conservative  measure  of capital  flight  - see appendix  II
below  - it is  clear  from  the above  ratios  the extent  of the damage  capital
flight  may have inflicted  on the  economic  fortunes  of Sudan.  If the
authorities  in Sudan  were able  to contain  this phenomenon  during  the seventies
and eighties,  the current  debilitating  debt problem  facing  the  country  would
not  have  materialized.  Also capital  flight  is judged  to be harmful  due  to the
foregone  growth  potential  that  it  caused  and  which  presumably  has  a  high
social  rate  of  return  for  a  developing  agrarian  economy  lacking  basic  physical
and  human  infrastructure  such as  that of Sudan.  Other  potential  negative
effects  of capital  flight  that have  been analyzed  in  the literature  that  may- 15  -
be  applicable  to Sudan;  include  the  erosion  of the tax  base,  the  negative
impact  on domestic  investment  and  the increased  marginal  cost of foreign
borrowing.
The  undesirable  macroeconomic  and  development  consequences  of  capital
flight  has  been convincingly  explored  in  Dornbusch  (1985),  Cuddington  (1986)
and  have  further  been  elaborated  for  the  case  of Sudan  in Ali (1988),  and  more
recently  for  Latin  America  in  Pastor  (1990). The most  critical  question  to
consider  is  what role,  if any,  trade  and financial  liberalization  played  in
accelerating  capital  flight  in  Sudan? and  should  exchange  control  be
considered  as a remedy7 I intend  to address  this issue  in the  next section
when I  discuss  a set  of simple  econometric  models  analyzing  the role of the
premium  in  the determination  of key  macroeconomic  indicators,  including
capital  flight.
3.  Statistical  Characteristics  of the  Black  Market  rate and  Premium
It is  obvious  from  the  above  description  that  the free  market  for
foreign  exchange  is quite  sizable  and  therefore  its  interaction  with  the  rest
of the  economy  is  bound  to have  important  implications  for  policy. Tables  (5)
and (6)  provide  some  baoic  statistical  data  on the  free  rate and  the premium
of the free  rate  relative  to the  official. Both tables  are organized  in such
a way so as  to distinguish  between  the  episodes  described  in tab.a (1)  of the
previous  section.
According  to  tables  (5)  and  (6)  both,  the  free  rate and  the  premium,
have  displayed  relatively  stable  behavior  throughout  the  period  before
February  1985.  The  brief  suspension  of  private  trading  in  foreign  exchange
during  Hay-Dec.,  1983  of  this  period  have  not  in fact  been perceived  as- 16 -
permanent  since  the free  rate  continued  to increase  and  the  premium  only
slightly  declined. In fact  this  brief  suspension  period  exhibited
considerably  less  volatility  as  compared  to the previous  period. The
following  sub-period  of January  1984-January  1985  which  marked  the re-
legalization  of private  foreign  exchange  trading  continued  to be characterized
by stable  behavior.
The  post February  1985  period  however,  witnessed  significant  jumps  in
both  the  size  and variability  of the  two rates. This period  which  marked  the
beginnings  of official  ban  of private  trading  in foreign  exchange  also
witnessed  an increasingly  concerted  effort  by the authorities  at enforcing
this  ban, a  matter  which  culminated  with the new  military  government  imposing
the  death  penalty  on alleged  violators.
From  the  above  discussion  it  appears  that the free  market  for  foreign
exchange  has functioned  smoothly,  and  that if any speculative  bubbles  do exist
they  must have  developed  at a later  stage,  perhaps  as a reaction  of risk
averse  agentp  to the  cumulative  effects  of erratic  policy  mistakes. The
availability  of weekly  and  daily  data  on the black  market  rate for  the  period
of May  1980  to February  1985  permits  a test for  bubbles  on a finely  sampled
data  set  as  well as a comparison  of the  characteristics  of the  daily  and
weekly  data  to the  quarterly  data.  Figures  (2)  gives  a closer  view of the
foreign  exchange  bubbles  for  the  post January  1985  period. To test (or
assess)  for  the existence  of such  bubbles  we analyze  the  stationarity  and  the
distributional  characteristics  of the  black  exchange  rate.  According  to Table
(7),  while  all series  considered  (quarterly,  monthly,  weekly  and daily)  are
not  stationary  at the  levels,  differencing  seems  to achieve  stationarity  in
all  cases  except  for  the daily  data.  According  to both,  the  Dickey-Fuller- 17 -
(DF) and the augmented Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  tests, we could reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the rate of change series for tne quarterly,
monthly and weekly data.  Hence these series are difference stationary.  The
daily series however, failed the ADF test.  The individual hypothesis of zero
skewness and zero excess kurtosis on the other hand, can be rejected for all
the series at any reasonable significance level.  Furthermore, this apparent
departure from normality in the unconditional d  ,t'.bution  of  the  free  rate,
is significant for both levels and differences for all the series as evidenced
from the skewness and Kurtosis tests.
The indirect tests of table (7) suggest that while bubbles - possibly
generated by seasonality, market thinness, or reaction to erratic domestic
policy mistakes may exist especially for daily data of the free exchange rate
in Sudan; this does not necessarily invalidate the relevance of economic
fundamentals to the determination of the free rate in the horizon of quarterly
and annual data --  the type of data commonly used in economic analysis.  In
fact  I  will show in section V that the quarterly data on the premium is
cointegrated  with economic fundamentals, table (A.2).  As such, a bubbles'
solution  cannot  exist  in  the  case  of  quarterly  exchange  rate  data  in  Sudan.' 0
Furthermore,  the  potential  for  the  existence  of  bubbles  in  the  data  should  not
be  associated  with  irrationality  of  market  participants.  Rational asset
market  bubbles  can  exist  in  a  world  of  risk-averse  agents  with  heterogenous
information  set,  see  Blanchard  and  Watson  (1982),  and  Meese  (1986)  for
example.
' 0 See  Kaminsky (1988) for a discussion on the nonexistence of bubbles under
cointegration.- 18  -
IV.  THE  PORSIGN  EXCHNGO MARKET  AND MACROECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  SUDAN
Table  (8)  shows  the  evolution  of the  black  market  rate and premium
around  devaluation  episodes. A typical  pattern  that  emerges  is that the
success  of official  devaluations  has  been  of only  temporary  nature. As shown
by the  table  the  premium  came  down  only for  the  month  of the devaluation  or at
most !or  the  one  or two  following  months. Furthermore,  even the achievement
of such  a  modest  gain  required  rather  massive  devaluations  and  when only  a
moderate  official  devaluation  was  effected  (as  in September  1979  for  example),
the  premium  actually  increased  rather  than  decreased,  see table (8). Another
general  pattern  is the  familiar  expected  devaluation  - driven  rise in  the
premium  and  in  the rate  of depreciation  of the free  rate observed  for  the few
months  prior  to devaluation. Finally,  it can  be observed  that the premium
displayed  a rising  long  term  trend.
In  the  previous  section  we emphasized  the statistical  characteristics  of
the  premium  (and  the free  rate)  and  the effects  of seasonality  and the
potential  for  the  existence  of  bubbles  in  the  very short  run (daily  data). In
this  section  I  will attemrt  to explain  the  above  story  in the  context  of the
existing  analytical  results  of the literature  on multiple  exchange  rates.
Subscribing  to  the  environment  described  above  for  Sudan,  we  assume  a
dual  exchange  rate  system  where an  officially  sanctioned  share,  z, of a
given  total  private  exports,  X, are  required  to be surrendered  to the
authorities  at the official  exchange  rate  Eo. The rate of crawl  of the
official  rate is fixed  at a.  Also  a share,  v, of total  private sector
imports,  I,  is allowed  through  the  official  market  at the rate E,  along
with  the  exogenously  given  government  imports,  Ig.  The rest of the commercial- 19  -
transactions  are settled  at the  black (free)  market  according  to the froely
floating  dual,  rate,  Eb. No financial  transaction  are legally  allowed  but  as
a result of mis-invoicing of exports  and imports, illegal capital accounts
transactions  take  place  at the  black  market  accordina  to the  rate,  Eb. The
stock  of foreign  assets  held  by the  private  sector,  P,  will therefore  change
according  to the position  of the  unreported  current  balance  of the private
sector. Private  sector  financial  wealth  is  given  by:
W  =  M + EbF  (1)
b~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
AssumLng  that  Eb represents  the  marginal  price  of imports,  aggregate  private
sector  imports  is  described  by:
M +E  F
a(  a(  +  F)  ,O<a<cl  (1)
Eb  q
Eb
where  m  E  and  q  E  is  the  black  market  rate  premium.
0  0
The  official  current  &ccount  balance  is equal  to the  change  in  reserves,  R,
and  is  given  by:
A  - z(l-¢)  X - v- a(m- +  F) - I  (2)
q  g
where  * is the  under-invoicing  ratio (mostly  migrant  workers  remittances  in
the  case  of Sudan).
"  Equating  official  current  account balance to the change in official
reserves  clearly  abstracts  from  external  debt  accumulation.  For  the  case  of  the
Sudan,  such  assumption  may be difficult  to justify,  especially  over the first
half of the 1980s.  In the analysis  of this section,  the story of Sudan's
external  borrowing  is taken  into  consideration,  however.  Furthermore,  in the
next  section  --  where  we estimated  a linearized  rational  expectation  version  of
this  model  using  quarterly  data  --  the  abstraction  from  the  uebt  aspects  will  be
necessitated  by e;apirical  considerations.- 20 -
The unreported current accouIt balance on the other hand is equal to F
where,
F  u  l(Z +  (1-z)  X - (l-v)  a(-  +  F)1 2
We make the  usual  assumption  that  domestic  credit  creation  is  used to
finance  the  public  sector  deficit,
'3
D  m  E  (g-t)  (4)
Since  the nominal stock of domestic mioney  M is given by
M  - E  R + D  (5)
0
(4)  and (5)  lead  to the  following  ,.ath  for  the change  in the stock  of real
domestic  money:'
4
m  - z(1-0)  X  v  a(  + F) - I + (g-t)  - nm  (6)
g  g
The  model is closed  by specifying  the  asset  market  equilibrium. Since
the  opportunity  cost  of holding  domestic  money relative  to foreign  money
is  given  by the  expected  rato  of  depreciation  of the free rate;  by assuming
'2For  simplicity  we are  abstracting  from  imports  over-invoicing  and  outright
smuggling  of exports  and imports.  The other more important  transactions  of
under-invoicing  of remittances  and the rest of exports  however,  are captured
through  *.
'3  This  assumption  also  abstracts  from  the  fact  that  not  all  credit  creation
is  to  finance  budget  deficits.  But  this  is  a  reasonable  approximation,  since  the
share  of  government  in  domestic  credit  expansion  has  consistently  been in  excess
of 60%.
Differentiating  equation  (5)  gives  M =  E0R +  RE0+  0, by making
the  plausible  assumption  that  official  reserve  appreciation  after
D  mg devaluations  are  not  monetized  (ie  E0R - 0), hence  we havem  R  E  w- 21 -
perfect foresight we have,
E
mb  X(Eb)  . and X'( )  0  (7)
H4+Eb?  E
which can be restated as:
m  qF  X  (q-  )  (8)
M+qF  q
Variants of the above simple model constitute a  common framework of
analysis in the dual exchange rate literature, see e.g. Lizondo (1987a,b),
Kiguel and Lizondo (1988),  Dornbuach (1986),  Dornbusch et al. (1983), and
Pinto (1987, 1988, a, b).  Analysis of the above model will require solving
the system of the three differential equations:  (3), (6), and (8).
To keep matters trackable, we impose the condition that R =  0.  For the
case of Sudan this seems to be a perfectly realistic assumption since the
average of the change in official reserve during the period under
consideration (1970-1989) is equal to a minuscule US 0.23 million per quarter,
even through it experienced considerable variation during the period.
I  s
At any rate the monetary rule (R  - o) simplifies matters considerably
since the above system of differential equations will become sequaential  and
the condition  m =  0 gives:  m  - g-t  (9)
Is  The  condition  R=0  is  referred  to  as  a  monetary  rule  in  terms  of  its
Lmplications  for  the  stationary  level  of  the  stock of real money (equation (9)),
but in fact it amounts  to  a  trade  policy  rule  where  Import  "quota"  enforced
through foreign exchange rationing is equal to current export revenue.- 22  -
which in indepondent of F  and q.  Also with R - 0 equation  (2) implies that:
- - I2.  v.a  (m  (10)
z(1-0) 
(  1(1-0)  q
Using (10) in (3), the stationarity condition F-0 gives,
m  + F , K(v, z, 0)  (11)
q  a
with K  >  0, K' (  0, and K' >  0
And from (8)  the stationarity  condition,  q-0,  gives:
Mn  *  u(i)  *  qF  (12)
Finally using (9) in (11) and (12), we obtain the other two stationary
solutions.
F*  (l-X(l))  K(vz  .)  (13)
*  a  g-t  (14)
q  K(v, z, 0)  IrA(W)  X
The above derived stationary equilibrium solutions (especially the one for the
premium)  will  be  the  focus  of  the  analysis  for the remaining of this sub-
section.  In  the  next  section  we  will  use  a  linearized  rational  expectation
version  oS  this model to estimate the determinants of the premium.
Equation (14)  above  links  the  steady  state  level  for the  premium  with
the fiscal deficit.  The equation calls for a atrong role for fiscal
retrenchment while a policy of accelerated crawl in being pursued when there- 23 -
Is considerable  flight  from  domestic  money  and  the  policy  objective  is to
reduce  the level  of the  premium  and  to achieve  ultimate  unification  of the  two
rates. This is  because  a  policy  of accelerated  depreciation  by itself  may
lead to only a slight reduction in the premium  and in the extreme came when
I  >  1, the  premium  may in fact  increase  at the steady  state,  Pinto
(1987). The  need for  fiscal  adjustment  Ls  made all  the  more important  when as
happened  in  Sudan  a  policy  of asymmetric  trade  liberalization  (based  on higher
priority  given  to import  liberalization  than  to export)  - is also  being
pursued. In  terms  of the  model  parameters  this  will lead  to a more reduction
in  v relative  to z, hence  other  things  equal  the premium  will increase  at the
steady  state.
The  experience  of the  Sudan  clearly  suggests  that the  effect  of the rate
of crawl  as a  determinant  of  the  premium  must  be balanced  against  the
potential  effect  of the  real  fiscal  deficit,  g-t, on the  premium.  Even if  we
assume  that increased  rate  of crawl  leads  to reduced  premium  level for  Sudan,
tables  (9)  and (10)  show  that  while  the  average  annual  rate  of devaluation
registered  above  32% for  the 1978-1987  period  as compared  to zero for  the
previous  sub-period  1970-73,  and  1974-1977;  both the  primary  and  total fiscal
deficits  as ratios  to GDP  has risen  considerably  during  the last  period. This
perhaps  partially  explains  that  despite  massive  devaluations  during  this
period,  the  premium  did  not  only  remain  steady  with respect  to past levels  but
have  in fact  registered  a slight  increase. During  the last  two  years 1988-89,
when  devaluations  were suepended  and fiscal  deficit  soared,  the  premium
increased  by almost  100  percent.
The  story  of monetary  emission  is entirely  consistent  with the fiscal
story,  a  matter  which  ratifies  our  asmumption  of a  basically  accommodating- 24  -
monetary  policy  imbedded  in  the  monetary  rule (D  - E0(g-t)). The  growth  in
real  domestic  credit  (deflated  by  the official  rate)  has  risen  considerably
during  the  1974-i977  with an annual  average  rate of growth  equal  to 37
percent. This period  witnessed  an era  of massive  spending  spree  aimed  at
supporting  a  rather  ambitious  development  program.  This  program  brought
impressive  arowth  performance  at  an  average  of  more  than  10  percent  in  real
terms,  see  table  (11).  The  almost  total  reliance  of  the  program  on  external
borrowing  and  dtficit  financing,  however,  resulted  in  a deficit  of about
US$232  million  in the  current  account  and  mounting  debt  problems,  see  table
(12).
The  other  set  of factors  that influences  the  premium  relate  to trade
policy  and  the composition  of  aggregate  output. The  trade liberalization
policies  adopted  in  Sudan  since  the  mid seventies  and  especially  after
September  1979  basically  aimed  at utilizing  SNWA savings  in order  to finance
much  need  consumer  goods  and  other  non-consumer  imports. This required
successive  shifting  of imports  from  the  official  market  to the free  market
with its  more depreciated  rate.  The increased  flow  demand  for  foreign
exchange  resulting  from  this  policy  is  captured  in the  model  through  the
parameter  v, which  leads  to higher  q  and lower  F at the  steady  state. On the
other  hand liberalization  of exports  has  been rather  limited  and  only  marginal
exports  were  allowed  to be traded  through  the free  market  on a consistent
basis. As such  the  destabilizing  effect  of import  liberalization  could  not  be
adequately  ameliorated  by  an  export  liberalization  effect  working  throtgh  the
parameter,  z,  to  reduce  the  premium.- 25 -
1.  The  Black  Market  Premiu  and  Macroeconomic  Perfoinsance
The declining economic fortunes of the country paved the way for the
implementation of the exchange rate, trade and financial liberalization that
started after September 1979.  The rate of growth of domestic credit continued
to be quite high, however.  During 1978-1987 period the rate of growth in real
domestic credit declined to the still high 28 percent, and during the last
period (1988-89) it even matched the levels set for 1974-1977 period, table
(10).  Under the exchange rate policy pursued during liberalization, such
monetary and fiscal policy are certainly inconsistent especially with regard
to the objective of  reducing the premium rate and achieving ultimate exchange
rate unification.  The high and rising premium ensured a continued
deterioration in the reported external accounts and a rising capital flight as
the sizable share of SNWA remittances continued to flow through the unofficial
channels.
A key factor behind the potential effect of the premium on economic
performance is its influence on the official real exchange rate.  Kiguel and
Lizondo (1988)  showed that a rising premium leads to real appreciation.1 6
Also using an empirical model of real exchange rate determination, Elbadawi
16  Following  Kiguel  and  Lizondo  (1988),  we  can  write  the  following
equilibrium in the nontraded goods sector:
p  (b(M+EbF) +N  =  Y
where PN is the price of nontraded goods, GN is government expenditure on
non-tradeables, YN is nontraded output and b is a constant such that
O<b<l.  Now defining the official real exchange rate by r=E /PN  ,  we
have:
r.b.(m+qF) + gN  Y N
Therefore a rising premium is consistent with rea. appreciation.- 26 -
(1989),  found  the premium  to be a  major  channel  through  which expected
devaluation  and  monetary  emission  can  cause  real appreciation. The evidence
on real  exchange  rate  movement  in Sudan  attest  to this finding. As shown  in
table (13)  the  real  exchange  rate  has  experienced  considerable  appreciation
during  the  post September  1979  period. This appreciation  is also consistent
with perhaps  considerable  real  overvaluation  since  the fundamentals  (terms  of
trade,  export  and import  policy)  clearly  indicate  a depreciating  equilibrium
real  rate.  Furthermore,  the higher  capital  flows  of the 1978-87  period  were
not  sustainable  afterwards,  table  (13). This story  is also consistent  with
the  worsening  growth  performance  of the economy  and  the declining  shares  of
investment  and  saving  in GDP,  table (11).
The inadequacy  of  the official  exchange  rate  policy is further
aggravated  by the interest  rate  policy  which  kept  the interest  rate at
ridiculously  low  rates  see  table (14)'  , which  also  explains  the  minuscule
share  of saving  in GDP  and  the  extremely  high  ratio  of consumption,  table
(11) .
For  the  remainder  of this  section  we  will  discuss  the results  of simple
econometric  models  emphasizing  the  role  of a high and  a rising  premium  --  such
as  the one  in  the Sudan  --  in  the  determination  of selected  key  macroeconomic
variables: capital  flight,  official  exports,  and  tax revenue  on foreign
trade.  I  will  also analyze  the  effect  of the various  regime  shifts (in  terms
of the  premium  levels  and  different  foreign  trade  and  payment  arrangements)  on
domestic  inflation. Table (15)  contains  the results  of the econometric
estimation. starting  with foreign  trade  tax revenue  (averages  more than  60%
17Interest  rates  were  abolished  in  the  Sudan  effective  1984,  but  reintroduced
in 1987  under  the rubric  'Compensatory  rate  system'.- 27 -
of total tax revenue in Sudan), I estimated two models, one with real tax
revenue on foreign irade (FTAXP)  as a dependent variable, and the other with
the dependent variable given by the ratio of foreign trade tax revenue to GDP
(FTAXY).  Both models' results show significant and negative effect for the
premium.  A high and rising premium leads to declining officially sanctioned
exports, and consequently official import decline as official foreign exchange
proceeds go down; if In  addition officially oanctioned imports do not rise
high enough to compensate for this decline, the tax base on foreign trade will
shrink.  The official real exchange rate (RER - E4/CPI)  has a negative effect
on FTAXP which indicates that the import reducing effect of real depreciation
outweighs its export expanding effect, leading on balance to a  smaller tax
base and tax revenue.  On the other hand, the RER has exactly the opposite
effect on FTAXY.  In both cases however, the RER effect is only marginally
significant.  For the FTAXY model, we could not reject the plausible
hypothesis of a unitary elasticity for real output, the same effect is also
positive in  the FTAXP model but is only marginally significant, however.  For
both models, the period 1983-87 has been one of low fiscal effort due to the
dramatically reduced share of the official (reported) economy in Sudan over
this period.
A closely related macroeconomic performance indicator estimated in Table
(15) is official merchandise exports.  The reason why I decided to consider
exports rather than official trade or current account balances is because
official imports is by and large determined by official foreign exchange
availability.  The results show strong and significant negative effect for the
premium (Eb/E.)  on official exports, with a 10% rise in the premium leading to
a 1.6% age points of GDP decline in official exports.  The real exchange rate- 28 -
relevant for official exports (PX/PN)"1  on the other hand, has a significant
and appreciable positive effect.  A real depreciation in (PX/PN) of 10% raises
official exports by 12.2% age point of GDP.  Finally an increase in current
income over its trend leads to higher exports in absolute terms, but to a
lower official exports as a ratio to GDP.
The final macroeconomic indicator estimated in Table (15) is capital
flight given in 1980 fixed US dollars (KFLT)"9  and as a ratio to change in the
stock of foreign debt (KFLTDEBT).  In both models, the premium has a positive
effect.  In the case of the KFLT model the premium effect is only marginally
significant, however.  The inadequacy  of the interest rate policy referred to
earlier is reflected in the positive and significant influence on capital
flight due to world interest rate (WIRATE)" obtained for both models.  The
period 1973-76 and 1985 witnessed unusually high KFLTDEBT ratios as reflected
in the positive coefficient of the two corresponding dummies.  The firat
period may simply reflect initial reactions to the beginnings of the worsening
economic conditions in Sudan while the country's indebtedness was still quite
low.  The 1985 spike in the KFLTDEBT ratio seems to be precipitated by the
authorities aggressive attempts at enforcing the exchange control which
started in February or by the increasing political instability that ultimately
led to the March-April popular uprising and the change of government  in April
6 of the same year.  The absolute level of capital flight (KFLT) on the other
hand, which has been rising steadily over the period, took a steep rise in
'g  Where  PN  is the price of nontradables.  The data  for  PX and  PN was
obtained from Elbadawi (1987,  89).
"  The estimates for capital flight are obtained from table  (4).
n  WIRATE is equal to annualized LIBOR on three months US dollar deposit-.- 29  -
1987 --  the year that witnessed the last devaluation in  the Sudan, before
declining sharply in 1988.
At the conclusion of Section III above we discussed the potential
negative effects of capital flight on the Sudan economy, and we asked the
question:  What role, if any, trade an financial liberalization played in
accelerating capital flight in Sudan?  and Should exchange control,  be
considered as a remedy?  The results discussed above provide a strong support
to the view that holds inadequate or incredible reform - such as Sudan's post
September  79 IMF-type stabilization programs  - to be responsible for capital
flight  through its influence on the premium.  This point is echoed in Ali
(1988) and Pastor (1990);  the strong  emphasis on exchange control as a remedy
for capital flight in Sudan as argued in Ali (1988) is rather dubious,
however.  As long as macroeconomic conditions are conducive to capital flight,
it  will  be  difficult  to  stop  capital  flight  in  Sudan  given  the  potential  for
off-shore market dealings in thxe  receiving countries of SNWA.  In fact this
assertion has been attested to by the recent experience of Sudan where capital
flight  rose  significantly  when  the  authorities attempted to enforce the
exchange  controls.
The  final  issue  I  address  in  the  context  of  macroeconomic  implication.
of  the  premium  is the potential inflationary effect of a rising premium.
First  of  all  the premium will have a direct effect on domestic inflation
through the price of tradeables.  Second, the change in the premium (or  the
black  market  rate)  may  reflect  the  influence of excess money supply on
inflation.  Under fixed exchange rate and official exchange control designed
to protect official reserve, an ex ante increase in the supply of money will
lead to an ex-post rise in the premium and inflation in order for the given- 30 -
stock  of money  to be held.  The  most important  effect  on domestic  inflation  of
extended  and  high  premium  episodem--such  am the one  experienced  by the Sudan,
could  however;  be generated  by their  influence  on expectation  of future
inflation  and  on the  persistence  of inflation,  since  the existence  of such
ep..sodes  suggests  that  future  devaluations  are likely  and  that  macroeconomic
policy  is  not sustainable. An shown  in  table (9)  a rising  black  market
premium  during  the last  two sub-periods,  1978-87  and  1988-90  has been
consistent  with higher  inflation. 2'  The quarterly  inflation  rates  increased
from  an average  rate  of about  3.8  percent  for  the 1974-87  period  to an average
of 6.6  for 1978-87  and  increa:ed  by more  than three  times  reaching  an average
of 14.8  percent  for  1988-90.
Cochrane  (1988)  suggested  the following  variance  ratio  test:
(1/k)  var  (t  - 7c -)/  var  (79  - s9-1)  in  order  to  measure  the  persistence  of
shocks  in any  variable  (inflation  in our  case).  This  ratio  will be equal  to
one if inflation  follows  a random  walk process,  and  it converges  to zero if it
follows  a stationary  process. Table (16)  and  Figure  (3)  report  Cochranes
variance  ratio  statistic  for  different  values  of k for  four  major  episodes
over  the 1970,  1 - 1990,  2 period. The  results  show  that even  though
inflation  in  the Sudan  remains  stationary  over all  the  episodes,  shocks  to
inflation  tend  to be more persistent  in  later  episodes,  however.  This implies
that  the high  premium  regime (1988-90)  have  been less  effective  in eliminating
inertia  in inflation  relative  to the lower  premium  episodes.A
2!  The implication  of this is that parallel  foreign  exchange  cannot  stop
inflation.
n  This does not mean that the premium is the main thing that matters.
Rather,  it  is entirely  possible  that  exogenous  shocks  or policy  instruments  are
influencing  both variables.- 31  -
V.  AN EMPIRICAL  MODEL  FOR THE  PREMIUM
In  this  section  I  will  estimate a linearizad  forward-  looking  version  of
the  model  of the above  section. The  economic  environment  in  question,  as
described  above,  is  one  of a sizable  black  market  for  foreign  exchange  in
which 'illegal'  albeit  relatively  riskiless  currency  substitution  takes  place
at a premium  rate.  This  market  is assumed  to be strongly  linked  to the  rest
of the  economy;  specifically  to the  money  market  and  the foreign  trade  sector.
The  specification  of the  premium  which  I  will solve  for in  this model  will be
consistent  with equilibriums  in  both  the asset  market  and the current  account
balance. Start4.ng  with  the asset  market  we posit  the following  relative  asset
demand  equation:
logqtF 'a 0 aEb  (15)
This  equation  is a linearized  version  of equation  (7)  of section  IV
above. We also have,  Eb ,  the  expected  rate  of depreciation  in the black
market  given  by:
*e  ^  ^e
Ebt  +l  +  ot 1  (16)
Now let  us assume  that  expectations  are  rational  and  that  4el.  and  0°c
are  given  by:
qtl  Et  (ALog  qt+,)  a  tAlog  qt+l  (17)
and
=  EI(A  log  Eo4,,)  =  t  A  log  Eoe. 1 (18)- 32  -
where  A is  the  difference  operator.
The above  set  of equations  suffices  for  the  asset  market  equilibrium.
For  the  current  account  I will  continue  to assume  that  the official  (reported)
balance  is  zero  i.e.  R - 0.  As we noted  in the  previous  section  this
amounts  to a  monetary  (or  foreign  trade)  rule  that  also simplifies  the  model
considerably.
Formally  I  will write  the  unreported  exports,  X  ,  and  unreported
imports,  I  u, in the following  generic  formas
X  -X  E0 l-)  z)  (19) u  u  E  0(1-t  X)  t9
Eb  m
u  u(e  '  E  t +t  ;v).(  - + F)  (20)
U  U  0'  in  QRq
()  (  .)  (4.)
E
0 where  e  - . Equation  (19)  specifies  unreported  exports  to  depend
positively  on  the  official  RER,  e,  which  signals  for  allocation  between  broad
tradeables  and  nontradeables.  X,  is  also  positively  influenced  by  the  level
of  black  market  rate relative  to the  tax adjusted  official  rate.  The
parameter,  z, the share  of  exports  required  to  be  surrendered  and  transacted
through  the  official  market  will have  a negative  affect  on X.  The
determinants  of  I,  also  have  similar  interpretations,  e  discourages  excessive
Eb
importing  in  general, E (l+t  +tQ)  reflects  an arbitrage  conditions  between
the  premium  and  the tax  rate  on imports  inclusive  of the Implicit  tax
due  to  QRs.  The shift  parameter,  v, (the  share  of imoorts  allowed  through  the- 33 -
official  market),  reflects  trade  liberalization.  Finally  I,  is proportional
to real  wealth  (-  + F)  where  nominal  finaniial  wealth  is  deflated  by E,
q
the  marginal  price  of imports.
From (19)  and (20),  we can  write  the  following  unreported  current
account  balance:
FXu  (  1  q  z)  u  (e,  v+t  )  (q +  F)  (21)
x  mQ
(  (+)  ()  )  M 
By imposing  equilibrium  in the  unreported  current  account  balance (F-0),
we can  write  the following  linear  logarithmic  function:
log  F  C  0+ C1 log  qt  c2log e-  c3log (l-t)  - c4log (1 + t + t  )
-c  log  mt-  c6H (t  t)  (22)
where  H (z,v)  reflect.  the  effect  of commercial  policy. Now  using
(15)  - (17),  and (22)  yields  the following  reduced  form  dynamic  equation
for  the  premium:
log q  -Alogq  6  + 6  E  + 6  log  m
t  t  t+l  0  1  t+1  2  t
-_ 3log  et+  64  log (l-tx t
+ 65 log (1+t  + tQ)t 5  m+tQR  t
+6  H(zt,  vt)  (23)
where X - a 1 /(l+a 1+  C1 )  C  1, and where the 6's are the corresponding
coefficients  in the  RHS.  Solution  of the  above  equation  for  log  q,  requires
the  knowledge  of  ^a  ,  the expected  official  exchange  rate devaluation  at
time  t + 1  given  information  at the  time  t.  The above  equation  suggests  the- 34 -
following  forecast  equation:
log S0 b  +  b0 log  E0 +  5  bl  o  log (RERb/RERO)ti
t+l  t  imo
+  Zb2  Alog E0 4  E  b31 Alog  m.  -i
-O  t-i  L-O
+  t+l  (A.23)
On the  other  hand  the  equation  (A.23)  may be justified  on the assumption  that
agents  in  the  economy  know  the  government  reaction  function;  and  that  they
form  their  expectations  according  to thia reaction  function,  in addition  to
the  record  of previous  devaluations,  and  the  history  of monetary  emission.
Where  the  third  term in  the RHS  of the  equation  is the  policy  reLction
function  which  is  based  on comparing  previous  periods  black  market  real
exchange  rate  to the  official  real  rate.  If the later  was overvalued
(smaller)  relative  to the  former  there  will  be a pressure  on the authorities
to devalue,  given  their  ultimate  objective  to unify  the two rates.  The  real
rates  are  def.ined  as:
E  E0P Ep0 RERb 2  b /p  and RERO  p  hence  the  reaction  function  can also
be interpreted  as  governed  by the  level  of the premium  in past periods,
HI= - ^  as before  is  the real  stock  of broad  money,  and e  is a stationary
Eo
disturbance  term.
Now going back to equation (23) define
the vector ' = ;  - i- 35 -
log  (1-tX)t  ,  log (1  +  tm +  tQR ),  H (ztfvt))',  and  obtain  the following
expression  for  the  steady  statc  level  of the  premium  for  a given  stationary
*
set  of the fundamentalc,  F
*  X  *
log  qt-  0  X  F  (24)
i-o  t  t+i
which  leads  to the  following  expression:
*  1  D  *  X  *
log qt - y_A  6  Ft  y-j  Z  1-A  t+j  (25)
If qtand  Ftare  first  difference  stationary,  then  the  RHS  of (25)  is 1(0)
and  the  LHS  of the  equation  defines  a cointegration  relationship  with
cointegrating  vector  1  6.  The  appendix  table (A.1)  report  the
i-XI
Dickey-Fuller  cests  for  cointegration.  According  to the  results  of the  tests,
we found  the  variables  to be cointegrated.  This test  also  supports  the no
bubble  solution  of (25)  as  well,  see  Kaminsky  (1988). The implications  of the
cointegration  for  the  premium  determination,  is  that  at  the  weekly  and  daily
Levels;  the  premium  may  be  influenced  by seasonality  and  other  bubbles  but at
the  quarterly  and annual  levels  it  were the  economic  fundamentals  that
determine  the  foreign  exchange  premium.
The  long-run  cointegrating  relationship  of equation  (25)  gives  rise  to
an  error-correction  specification  of form (Engle  and  Granger  (1987))t- 36  -
Alog  -t+l  d  S'Ft- log  qt)
R  ~~~~R  2
f  0  d1 AFt+l-i  +  _  +  d 3(B) et i  i
where  at  in  white  noise  process  and  d3(B) is a  finite  polynomial  in the
lag  operator  S.  While  the cointegrating  equation  give.  the long  run
(or  stationary)  equilibrium  determination  of  the  premium,  the  error-
correction  in  (26)  provide.  the  short-run  dynamic  specification  which
is  compatible  with the  long  run  equilibrium  relationship.
1.  Estimation  and Interpretation  of the  Model
Using  Sudarese  quarterly  data from  1970,  Ql to 1989,  Q4,  I estimated
equaticns  (A.23),  (25),  and (26)  above.  The  estimate  of equation  (A.23)  (see
equation  (A.23')  of appendix  III)  was  used  to  conrs'ruct  the  series  for
expected  future  devaluati&n. The  cther  two  equations  were then  estimated
sequentially  and reported  below  in (27)  and (28).
D  In fact  strict  application  of the  cointegration  model  of equations  (24)
and  (25)  yields  an  error-correction  equation  with  only  the  error-correction  term
( 11A  8'Fr  - log  qt)  in  the  RHS  of equation  (26).  The  general  representation
of  Alog  qM.e in equation  (26),  therefore,  provides  a test of  this  strict
interpretation  of  the  model. By  including  lagged  dependent  variables,  the  above
specification  also  accounts  for  the  existence  of important  MA components  in the
disturbance  term  process.- 37 -
log q  - 0.  10 log m 1 -0.  17 log *i  +  0.  30
(9.66)  (-1.68)  (3.87)
-0.05 DUN (79Q3-81Q2)  -0.13 DUM (81Q3-83Q1)
(-1.76)  (-4.10)
-0.12  DUN (83Q2-83Q4)  +0.08  DUN (85Q1-89Q2)
(-2.91)  (3.69)
R2  .0.52,  R  47,  DW - 1.21  (27)
A log  qc+l  0.47  z1  . 8F  - log  qe) A log  q~. 1 =  (4.  19)  (11t
+ 0.60  A  log  . 0.33 
(4.60)  ^  (6.09)  ^ot,
(-.80  is  Alge+  3.87  lg(1-t:i'
(-.80)  log  e  (2.10)  log  xe
1  058  log  (1  U  t,  + taR)  t (1.60)  Q)
- 0.25  A log qt_-  0.1  is
(-3.19)  2-2  (-226)  s  log  t-3
R2 =  0.68,  R2 0.65,  DW = 1.98  (28)
t  - statistics  are  in  parenthesis.  With  regard  to  the  first  equation,  even
though the tax policy terms appear to be  non-stationary  (Table (A.2)), they
were  not found to be significant and the model is still cointegrated when I
dropped  them  out.  The  tax  policy effect is found to be significunt and- 38 -
consistent  with  the  model  predictions,  however,  in  the  error-correction
equation.  >
First,  let  me consider  the  error-correction  equation  in 128),  which
gives  the  short-run  dynamic  aspects  of  the  premium  determination.  In  this
equation  the  dyvamic  behavior  is  reflected  by  the  error-correction  term  and
its  positive  (but  less  than one)  and  significant  coefficient.  If  the
fundamentals  in  the  previous  period  calls  for  a higher  premium  than
the  observed  ie.  1A 6'Ft-  1°9gt  >0;  then  since  the  coefficient  is positive,
the  level  of the  premium  in the following  period  will increase. The results
also  show  substantial  and  significant  short  run  influences  for  changes  in
expectation  of  future  devaluations  and  in  the  stock  of  money.  As  predicted  by
the  model,  a  higher  tax  on  exports=  reduces  the  premium  in  the  short-run,
while  a  higher  import  tax  causes  the  premium  to  rise.  Real  depreciation  on
the  other  hand,  has  a  negative  short-run  effect  on  the  premium.  Finally,
changes  in  the  premium  as-e  shown  to  display  lag  structure  extending  up  to  the
fourth  quarter.  Now turning  to  the  long  run  specification  results  of
equation  (27),  we start  with the  effects  of commercial  policy  and other
policy-related  regime  shifts.  The  commercial  policy  term H (z,v)  which
accounts  for  the  effect  of  trade  liberalization  is  represented  by DUM (79Q3-
81Q2)  and  DUM (81Q3-83Q1),  while  policy  reversals  are  represented  by  the  other
two  dummies.  As  we  mentioned  earlier,  trade  liberalization  in  Sudan,  has  been
2  This  may be explained  by  the fact  that the  data for  tx, tm, and  t, were
originally obtained from  Elbadawi (1987, 89)  in  annual  form  and  then
quarteralized  for  the  purpose  of the  above  regressions.
I  A  priori  the  export  tax  effect  could  go  either  way,  since  It  may  also
reduce  the  overall  level  of  exports  and  hence  the  portion  that  goes  into
smuggling._ 39 _
one  of  successive  transfor  of  imports  to  the  free  market  where  imports  are
financed  by  'own  resources,  obtained  through  the  black  'froe'  market;  for
export  however,  Lt has  generally  been  slow  and  largely  confined  to  marginal
exports.
This  effect  of  such  trade  policy  which  will  be  to  exert  an  upward
pressure  on  the  stationary  level  of  the  premium  should  be  balanced  with  other
apecti  of  trade  liberalization  that  may  lead  to  enhanced  flow  of  remittances
and  imports  and  hence  less  scarcity  rents  on  the  latter.  This  second  effect
should  cause  the  premium  to  decline.  The  negative  coefficients  for  the  firat
two  dummies  of  equation  (27)  above,  show  that  the  net  effect  of  trade-
liberalization  has  been  a  reduction  on  the  long-run  level  of  the  premium.
DUK(83Q2-8344)  represents  a  period  of  a  brief  suspension  between  the  two
lLberalization  periods  1981Q3-1983Q1  and  1984Q1-1985Q1  during  which  the  black
market  was  fully  legalized  (see  Table  (1)).  As  the  results  show,  thi,  brief
suspension  measure  was  correctly  anticipated  by  agents  in  the  economy  to  be
temporary  and  therefore  it  did  not  alter  the  negative  influence  of
liberalization  on  the  premium.  After  February  1985,  however,  when  the
authorities  began  to  slow  down  the  liberalization  drive,  and  then  started
driftlng  towards  more  tightened  levels  of  exchange  controlsl  the  long-term
level  of  the  premium  experienced  a  rise as  reflected  by  the  coefficient  of  DUM
(8SQ1-89Q2).
The  other lng  run  determinant  that  reflects  the  current  account
condition  ls  the  official  real  exchange  rate  which  has an elasticity  of  -0.17.
This  effect  shows  the  importance  of  official  real  axchangs  rate  bvervaluation
in  explaining  the persistence  of  the high  premium  in  Sudan.  So  what  is  needed
to  bring  down  the level  of  the  premium  in  the  long  run  is  more  than  just  a- 40  -
nominal  devaluation,  rather  it is  the  effectiveness  or the  officiecny  of  that
devaluation.  The  long  run  effect  of real  wealth  as  reflected  by  the
coefficient  of log,  m  in  equation  (27)  is  slightly  smaller  at  0.  10 but  much
more  significant,  however.
The  lou;  run  influences  of the a&-et  market  provide  for  sou*  interesting
interpretations  with  regard  to the  role  of the  steady  state  fiscal  deficit,
g-t,  and  the  rate  of  official  depreciation  i  Ln the  determination  of  the
stationary  level  of the  premium. At the steady  state,  we  have
E  a  ,  and m* - g-t/m  ;  hence the implied  impact effect  of the fLscal
0t+l
deficit  (g-t)  on the  steady  state  level  of the premium  Is low  at 0.10 (similar
to  that  of real  wealth). once  we allow  for  the feedback  of the  rise  on the
fiscal  deficit  on we  (appendLx  quation (A.23')),  however,  the  cumulatlve
elasticity  of the  premium  with respect  to the fiscal  deflcit  can  be quite  high
(about  300%).  Therefore  a reduction  in the  rate  of growth  of the flical
deflcit  for  a given  rate  of crawl  by say  5  percent  for  example,  will lead  to a
15  percent  reduction  in the level  of the premium.
Also  from  equation  (27)  we can  solve  for  the  elasticity  of the  relative
asset  demand  for  domestic  money  with respect  to no,  which is  equal  to about
-3.0w'.  This  allows  us to derive  the  threshold  level  of expected  depreciation
(i  . 33  percent)  that is  consistent  with  a negative  unitary  elasticity. A
stationary  rate  of crawl  or expected  rate  of devaluation  in  excess  of 33
21  This  *lasticity  is  obtained  by  substituting  for
I  gEO.  - log  Eo 0 from  the  appendix  equation  (A.  23) in  equation  (27)
and  solving  for  the  cumulative  effect  of  (g-t)  on q as:
10.10+(0.30)(0.83))/[l-(0.30)(1.25+0.52+0.41+0.76)I  - 2.92.- 41 -
percent  runs  the  risk  of leading  to hiaher  premium  for  a given  level  of fiscal
deficit  and  commercial  policy. Figure  (4)  depicts  annual price inflation  and
the annualized  derived  threshold  level  (ff*  - 37). An can  be seen from  the
graph,  the  tendancy  of inflation  to overshoot  the  threshold  for  a continuum  of
extended  period  (since  1984)  confirms  the  stylized  fact  of the existence  of
significant  flight  from  domestic  money'  in  Sudan.
This  graph  could  be useful  in  the  interpretation  of the  observed
increasing  difficulty  at generating  seigniorage  revenue  as shown  by the
aggregate  indicators  of table (10). This  interpretation  will  provide  an
explanation  to the  opportunities  for  and  the  limits  to, the  trade-off  between
the  premium  as an Lmplicit  tax  on exporters  and  the inflation  tax; that  have
actually  existed  during  the period  considered. Starting  with the evidence  on
table (10),  we note  that seigniorage 2 revenue  as a ratio  to GDP increased
from  2.8 percent  in 1974-77  to 5.4  percent  in 1978-87,  while  the fiscal
deficit  increased  fron  5.8  percent  to GDP  to a staggering  12.9  percent  between
the  two  periods. The  premium  however,  remained  fairly  stable  at about  178
percent  during  each of  the two  periods. This  obviously  suggest  some sort  of a
trade-off  as  well as a relative  ease in  raising  revenue  from  the inflation
tax,  during  the  two  period. On the  other  hand  the  opposite  happened  for  the
last  two  years  1988-89. The seigniorage  revenue  declined  to only 3 percent  of
GDP  while  the fiscal  deficit  only  slightly  increased  (from  12.9  to 15.9
percent),  yet  the  premium  soared  to above  300  percent. This  evidence  seems  to
27 This  means  that  the  premium  must  be  higher  for  the  given  stock  of  domestic
money  to be willingly  held.
a Strictly  speaking,  seigniorage  revenue  is not in general  equal to the
revenue  from  the inflation  tax (except  when  1h=0  )- 42 -
be fairly  consistent  with the  predlctions  of the  graph  in terms  of domeutic
inflation. During  the  1978-86  period  the average  level  of inflation  was less
than  the threshold. Therefore  it  appears  that there  were potential  for  trade-
off  between  the two  Implicit  forms  of taxation  during  this period. on  the
other  hand,  for  the  1987-90  period  actual  domestic  inflation  averaged  about  40
percent; hence  the  model  prediction  of both rising  premium  and  declining
revenues  from  inflation,  which  was  ratified  by the above  evidence.- 43 -
V1  S  S  CONCLUDING  RUIARKS  AND XNPLICA$IONS  FOR  FUTURE  ECONOMIC  REFORM
In  the  previous  sections  of this paper  I  have studied  the  macroeconomics
of  multiple  exchange  rates  and  black  market  for foreign  exchange  Ln Sudan.  The
objectives  of the study  were laid  out in  the introduction  to this paper;  which
were  to  understand  the  motive(s)  and  cause(s)  that  gave rise  to the above
system,  the  determinants  of the  black  market  premium  -both  the short  run  asset
market  determinants  and  the  longer  run  trade  oriented  influences,  and  finally
the  extent  to which  the  presence  of such  black  market  might have interfered
with  macroeconomic  management  cf the  economy  and the  lessons  that can  be drawn
for  the  design  of future  policy.
The  analysis  of section  I:  (and  appendix  I) identifies  the achievement
of a significant  increase  in  the flow  of the  enormous  remittances  of Sudanese
nationals  working  abroad  through  the 'legal'  channels,  as the  main objective
of  the program.  In  the  short  run  the  enhanced  foreign  exchange  resources  can
be allocated  more efficiently  in order  to finance  much  needed  imports  and
other  transactions,  whilst  at the  same  time  the exchange  rate  policy  can  help
promote  exports  and  curb  the  effective  demand  for  Imports.  The  central
policies  deployed  as  part  of  the  pout  September  1979  economic  reform  programs
and  designed  to achieve  this  goal  among  others,  were based  on discrete  maxi
devaluations  of the  exchange  rate  and gradual  trade  liberalization  reforms
with  an eye  on achieving  exchange  rate unification  and  the  ultimate
integration  of the  black  market  into  the regular  economy.
To analyze  the  reasons  behind  the failure  of the above  economic  reform,
I  studied  the  determinants  of the  black  market  premium  using  a model  that
accounts  for  both  portfolio  and  flow  considerations  as well as the parameters
of official  foreign  trade  policy. A linearized  version  of this  model- 44 -
emphasizing  the role  of expectation  and  the  distinction  of the long  run flow
and aet  determinants  of the  premium  from  the short  run  dynamic  influences,
was  estimated  as well.
Real  exchange  rate  depreciation  was found  to have a eignificant  negative
effect  on the premium  both  in the  short  run  and in the long  run.  This finding
points  to the  key role  real  depreciation  can  play in Lmproving  current  account
balances  and  consequently  in  raising  the stock  of foreign  money  held by both
the  official  and the  private  sectors.  Expectations  of future  devaluations  were
predicted  by the  model  to have  a strong  and significant  positive  effect  on the
premium,  this result  also  shows  that  there  has  been considerable  flight  from
domestic  money.  By invoking  the  direct  link  assumed  in  the  model between  real
fiscal  deficit  and  monetary  emission,  the fiscal  deficit  will have a direct
positive  impact  effect  on  the  stationary  level  of  the  premium.  When  its
indirect  effect  through  expectations  is  considered  as  well,  the  fiscal  deficit
influence  on  the  premium  can  be  quite  substantial.  Finally  the  effect  of trade
liberalization  - proxied  by a  dummy  variable  - was  negative  and  significant.
The  rather  asymmetric  nature  of this  policy  - which  emphasized  liberalization
of the import  side  compared  to  export  - should  exert  an  upward  pressure  on  the
premium,  but seems  to be  more than  outweighed  by the  effects  of the policy  on
imported  goods  availability  and  on the supply  of remittances,  which  work in
the  opposite  direction.
Therefore,  the  main  conclusion  that came  out  of this  analysis  is  that
the lack  of strong  commitment  to fiscal  retrenchment  has  been  the main cause
behind  the failure  of  economic  reform  in  the Sudan.  Because  the steady  state
level  of the  premium  in  the  black  market  for foreign  exchange  depends
critically  on the size  of the fiscal  deficit,  a devaluation  policy  by itself- 45 -
will  not  reduce  the  premium  in the  long  run  unless  preceded  or accompanied  by
a serious  fiscal  adjustment.  Furthermore  when a large  fiscal  deficit  peruiuts
and  credibility  is low  aggressive  devaluation  and  trade liberalization  policy
aimed  at exchange  rate  unification  and integration  of the black  market,  will
run  the  risk  of leading  to speculation  of further  devaluations,  large  scale
currency  substitution  and  a rising  premium.
According  to the  analysis  of Sectioi.  (IV.1)  of this paper,  a rising
premium  is shown  to have  negative  Impacts  on official  exports  and foreign
trade  taxes,  as well as a positive  effect  on capital  flight. Therefore,  a
rising  premium  and  expanding  black  market  could  have  serious  fiscal  and
commercial  policy  implications  by squeezing  the tax  base in foreign  trade
transactions  and  by expanding  the  opportunities  for  large  scale  rent seeking
activities.  A high  premium  also  aggravates  the debt  problem  and  the foreign
exchange  constraint  through  its  effects  on capital  flight  and  the recorded
current  account  balance.
The above  analytical  framework  and  its  corresponding  policy  implications
is  typical  of this literature  (e.g.  Pinto  oy.cit.),  and  the evidence  is  also
not  limited  to the Sudan;  other  experiences  of failed  stabilization  efforts  in
Africa  such  as the  ones  of Sierra  Leone  and Zambia  can  be cited.  The  novelty
of the  analysis  of this  paper,  however,  is  that the  primacy  of the fiscal
policy  both in terms  of sequencing  and  magnitude,  derives  not  only from its
influence  on the stationary  level  of the  premium;  but equally,  if not
importantly,  from  the key  role  played  by the fiscal  deficit  in influencing
expectation  of future  devaluation.  Furthermore,  when the fiscal  problem  is  not
adequately  addressed,  the  resulting  high  expectations  of future  devaluations
may lead  to a rising  premium  and  declining  revenue  from  the inflation  tax- 46 -
regardless  of the exchange  rate  policy  pursued.  Therefore,  under  conditions  of
large  fiscal  deficits  and  low  credibility,  an  exchange  rate  policy  of
accelerated  crawl is  only  necessary  (but  not suf  if  cient)  for  generating
unsustainable  post unification  inflation  or policy  revereal. This finding
substantiall-  strengthens  the  case  for  effecting  structural  reform  aimed  at
the  fiscal  sector  at an early  stage  of the stabilization  program.
1.  Implications  for  Future  Economic  Reform  in  the  Sudan
We emerge  from  the above  diucussion  with the conclusion  that for  an
economy  with  a sizable  parallel  market  and a large  foreign  economic  enclave  in
the  form  of nationals  working  abroad  such  as Sudan;  successful  stabilization
based  on exchange  rate  and trade  reform  do not only  require  accompanying  or
preceding  fiscal  reform,  but  the fiscal  program  may have to be credible  enough
to be perceived  as the  major  and  most  enduring  component  of the reform
package.  Also a trade  reform  tha  aiased  towards  liberalization  of imports
vis-a-vis  exports  is likely  to exert  upward  pressures  on the  premium  for  any
given  level  of the fiscal  deficit  or rate of official  exchange  rate
depreciation.  In the case  of Sudanese  stabilization  this policy  not only
contributed  to the failure  of unification  but also  provided  for  a biased
structure  of Incentives  against  agriculture  and in favor  of services  and
nontradeables,  Elbadawi  (1989).
The  widely  shared  professional  view in Sudan  and in the international
community  is  that economic  reform  in Sudan  should  start  with strong  and  deep
stabilization  program  aimed  at reducing  the  more than 80 percent  level  of
inflation.  This stabilization  effort  which  must be made at the  early stages  of
the  program  must be followed  by reforms  in  the areas  of the  tax system,- 47 -
expenditure  structt  -e,  and  cost  recovery;  and  deregulation  and  parastatal
reform.  The  final  stage  of the  program  should  be geared  to the longer  run
development  issues  such  as rehabilitation  and  expansion  of education  and
health  servicem,  agricultural  research  and  infrastructure,  and the
environment.  The  findings  of  thiu  paper  -summarized  in  the  above  conclusion-
can  contribute  to the  design  and  sequencing  of the  above  broadly  based  program
especially  with regard  to the stabilization  phase.
It is  also the  consensus  view  that  even  with a serious  and successful
reform  program  economic  recovery  in Sudan  will require  substantial  debt
relief." Given  the  right  policies  however,  Sudan  can count  on the
substantial  saving  of her  nationals  working  abroad  to finance  economic  growth
and  to help  pay her foreign  debt.  According  to some  recent  World  Bank
estimates,  if  most or all  potential  savings  were sent  to Sudan,  the saving
from  remittances  is estimated  (conservatively)  to account  for  6 percent  of GDP
and  could  go as high  as 24 percent  of GDP.  If  we also consAder'the  potential
for  luring  back the savings  that  went  out  as capital  flight,  the remittances
can  play  a key role in  financing  oconomic  growth  in  Sudan.
Notwithstanding  the  still  serious  debt problem;  the  main problem  of Sudan  with
regard  to the finance  of investment  and  long  term  growth,  will then  become  a
problem  of  designing  appropriate  policies  to attract  these  remittances  through
the  official  or legal  channels  rather  than  the shortage  of foreign  exchange  or
the  paucity  of domestic  saving.
The  experience  of the past  few  years  in Sudan  tells  us that  under
conditions  of real  overvaluation,  policies  aimed  at achieving  the above
"The  World  Bank  estimated  that  by June  1990,  Sud&n's  stock  of foreign  debt
will  account  for  1500  percent  of exports  and 110  percent  of GDP.- 48  -
objective  through  regulating  the  flow  of the  remittances,  or  initroducing
'incentive  gimmicks'  such  an  subsidized  land  male  or  special  import  privileges
to  expatriate  workers  in  return  for  "sending  their  foreign  exchange  through  the
official  channels,  were  extremely  ineffective.  Subscribing  to the analysis  of
this  paper,  I  think  a  credible  exchauge  rate  and trade  reform  supported  with
consiutent  mAcroeconomic  policy  is  critical  for  the realization  of the full
potential  from  theme  remittances.  Even  when  the  program  was not judged  to be
credible  enough,  "the  potency  of the  exchange  rate and  trade  policies  in
attracting  remittances,  at least  through  the  official  channel,  was amply
demonstrated  between  August  1987  and  June 1989,  when  Sudanese  were allowed  to
use  the parallel  market  exchange  rate  for lown-  resource,  imports.  Over US$
1.2  billion  worth  of sown-resource'  financed  licenses  were franked  by the Bank
of Sudan  during  this  period,"  a  recent  World  Bank document.  Therefore  in
addition  to other  reforms  in  key  areas  such  as the financial  system  and
investment  policy,  the  foreign  trade  and  exchange  rate  stabiiization  program
will  play  an equally  important  role  in effecting  the  much needed  transition
from  adjustment  to growth.-49-
TABLE 1: EXCHANGE RATE MARKET IN THE SUDAN.
OFFTCAL RECULATD  iAT  PAT  FU
eXcIIAN  PAXArL  WORM  MAu  h
PERIOD  RAM  PAM RMTA=ANCU  RAT
1. EXCHANGE CONTROL (1955 - AUG 1979)
19S5 - MAY7S  0.55
Im  0).35  0.40  0.61
JULY 1973  0.35  0.40  0.45  0.61
JAN 1974  0.35  0.40  046  - o.0
JULY 1976  0.40  0.40  0.57  0m5
MARCH 1979  0.40  0.40  0.67  0.67
2.  NTIAL  LIBERALIZATION  ATTEMPr  (SEPT 1979 - JUE  1931)
SEM1  1979  0.0  0.80  1.00
SEPT 1980  0.50  0.80  . 1.10
JUNE  1981  0.50  0.80  . 0.90
,3.  LEGALIZED  FREE  MARKET (JUL  1981 - APR  1983:  JAN  1984 - JAN  1985)
. JULY  1983 - APRIL 1983
JULY  1981  0.50  0.20  1.08  0.94
NOV  1981  0.90  *1.10  1.25
JUNE 1982  0.90  1.13  1.41
AUG  1982  1.30  - 1.75  1.43
NOV 1982  1.30  I.75  2.17
FEB  1983  1.30  1.75  1.85  1.6q
MAR 1983  1.30  1.75  . 1.75
b.  MAY 1983 - DEC 1983 ( BREF  SUSPENSION)
MAY 1983  1.30  1.75  0 2
JUNE  1983  1.30  1.80  - . 1.75
DEC 1938  1.30  1.50  . . 00
c.  JAN 194  - JAN 1985
JAN  1984  1.30  1.80  2.04
JUNE 19U4  1.30  1.80  2.00  2.63
OCT 1984  1.30  2..0  - . 2.50
JAN 1985  1.30  2.10  3.60  3.03
4.  QUASI-LEGALIZED  FREE MARKET  (FEB.  1985 - ,UNE  1989)
FEB 195  2.5  3.30  *  4.35
MAR  1986  2.50  4.00  . . 7.69
APR  1987  2.50  4.00  6.25
oC  1987  4.50  4CA0  . 7.69
OCT 1988  4.S0  11.30  . . 14.29
JUNE 1989  4.50  12L10  -.  5.00
5. POLICY  REVERSALS  (JULY  1989 - PRESENT)
JULY  1989  4.50  12.1C  ,  16.67
SEPr 1989  4.50  12.10  . . 12.50
DEC 1939  4.50  12.10  . 20.00
FEB 1990  I.M0  12.10  33.33
DEC t990  4.50  12.10  o.  0.- 50  -
T  ABLE 2: REMItTANCES BY NATIONALS  WORKING  ABROAD
YEAR  OFFICIAL  TOTAL  OFF.REMIT/  OFF. REMlT/  OFF.REMIT/
REMITs.  REMITs.  EXPORTS(%)  IMPORTS(%)  GDP(%)
1973/74  24.40  107.49  5.09  3.94  0.79
1974/75  66.10  291.19  12.55  6.47  1.67
1975/76  150.70  663.88  '5  12.90  3.12
1976/77  172.00  757.71  2'...A  15.17  2.86
1977178  221.00  973.57  31.75  16.25  3.08
1978/79  240.00  1057.27  34.32  18.16  3.15
1979/80  209.00  920.70  25.80  13.09  2.69
1980/81  305.00  1343.61  40.78  16.95  3.62
1981/82  350.00  IS41.85  52.47  17.38  4.29
1982/83  415.00  1828.19  50.54  23.00  5.62
1983/84  395.00  1740.09  41.92  24.08  4.80
1984/85  430.00  1894.27  53.72  30.84  5.46
1985/86  350.00  1541.85  49.83  26.16  4.40
1986/87  250.00  1101.32  35.63  22.08  2.61
1987/88  445.00  1960.35  67.85  30.66  4.71
1988/89  294.0U  1?95.15  40.26  19.74  2.32
NOTES:
C fficial  and total remittances  in million USS.
Figures for 1987/88  and 1988/89  are preliminary estimates.
The data on official remittances  are obtained from various
World Bank and Bank of Sudan  reports.
Total remittances  are calculated  from official remittances,
based on evidence from migrant household  surveys which gives
an average ratio of official tottotal remittances  of around 23  %.-51-
TABLE 3: THE IMPORT 1tEGIME  IN THE SUDAN
TOTAL  SELF-FINANCED  NON-OFFICIAL
YEAR  IMPORTS  IMPORTS  REMlTTANCES  SFI1N0 R(%)  SFY/TOTM  (*)
PRE SEPTEMBER  1979
1972173  375.40  51.09  16.69  306.16  13.61
1973174  469.33  83.80  83.09  100.86  17.85
1974/75  505.98  57.69  225.09  25.63  11.40
1975n6  598.40  42.19  513.18  8.22  7.05
1976M  767.44  102.75  585.71  17.54  13.39
POST SEPTEMBER  1979
1981/82  2014.00  809.80  1191.85  67.94  40.21
1982183  1804.00  920.70  1413.19  65.15  51.04
1983/84  1640.40  1031.70  1345.09  76.70  62.89
1984185  1394.50  1080.80  1464.27  73.81  77.50
1985/86  1338.10  - 1191.85  - -
1986/87  1132.30  - 851.32  - -
1987/88  1451.20  594.70  1515.35  39.25  40.98
1988/89  1489.30  627.00  1001.15  62.63  42.10
NOTES:  Figures m millions  of USS except
SFI/N-O R - Self-financed Imports / Non-official Remittances and
SFI/TOTM =  Self-financed Imports / Total Imports
which are expressed as percentages- 52  -
TABLE  4: CAPITAL  FUGHT
YEAR  CAP.FLT  CAP.FLT/  NET  CAP.FLTI
(million  US$)  DEBT INFLOW(%)  GDP(%)
1973  154.47  203.25  6.00
1974  743.30  176.60  20.77
1975  922.52  237.95  21.26
1976  954.96  237.20  17.99
1977  265.10  84.56  3.95
1978  513.40  115.40  6.72
1979  805.90  131.75  10.63
1980  903.63  137.43  11.38
1981  900.83  157.43  10.11
1982  1469.96  166.72  19.88
1983  661.20  151.23  8.96
1984  409.77  170.31  4.51
1985  1106.75  1305.13  16.60
1986  528.92  901.06  5.45
1987  1039.05  651.04  9.06
1988  532.25  164.38  5.45
NOTES:
Definition  of capital  flight  is in Appendix 2.
Net Debt  Inflow: Disbursments  less amortization  and interest  payments
Includes new debt only
SOURCE:  IFS,  ANDREX.  WORLD  DEBT  TABLES-53-
TABLE  5: BASIC  STATISTICS  FOR  THE  BLACK  MARKET  PREMIUM  (monthly  data)
1  2  3  4  S  6  7
JAN 1970. SEP 1979-  JUL  19S1- MAY  193  JAN 1934- FEB  1985- JUL 1989.
PERIOD  AUC  1979 JUN 19t1  APR  1983  DEC  1933  JAN  1985  JUN 1959  NOV  1990
MEAN  1.74  1.88  1.52  1.45  1.93  2.46  7.69
STANDARD
DEVIATION  0.20  0.22  0.24  0.03  0.17  0.96  3.56
COEFFICIENT
OF VARIATION  0.11  0.12  0.16  0.06  0.09  0.39  0.46
MEDIAN  1.72  1.93  1.56  1.49  1.93  2.15  8.89
MAXIMUM
VALUE  2.45  2.26  1.96  1.54  2.33  5.56  11.11
MINIMUM
VALUE  1.37  1.60  1.03  1.37  1.57  !.21  2.78-54-
TABLE 6: BASIC STATISTICS FOR THE BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE (monthly data)
1  2  3  4  5  6  7
JAN  197  SEP 1979. JUL  1981- MAY  1983-  JAN  194  FEB  1915-  UL 1919.
PERIOD  AUG  1979  JUN 1981  APR 1983  DEC 1983 JAN 1985  JUN 1959  NOV  1990
MEAN  0.62  0.94  1.39  1.88  2.51  8.51  34.62
STANDARD
DEVIATION  0.20  0.07  0.12  0.35  0.12  5.24  16.01
COEFFICIENT
OF VARIATION  0.11  0.12  0.25  0.06  0.09  0.61  0.46
1MEDIAN  0.68  0.97  1.39  1.94  2.50  10.63  40.00
MAXIMUM
VALUE  0.85  1.12  2.17  2.00  3.03  25.00  50.00
MINIMUM
VALUE  0.48  0.80  0.89  1.72  2.04  3.03  12.50-55-
TABL, 7: STATIONARITY,  SKEWNESS  AND KURTOSIS  COEFICrENTS FOR
THE BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE  RATE
QUARTERLY  MONTHLY  WEEKLY  DAILY
PERIOD  (1970-89)  (1970-89)  (1970-8)  (01/84-02185)
A) LEVEL LOG Eb
KURTOSIS  5.69  6.33  1.21  4.20
COEFFICIENT  (0.41E-22)  (0. 14E-8S)  (0.2E-03)  (0.61E-31)
SKEWNESS  2.43  2152  0.93  1.96
COEFFICIENT  (0.37E-17)  (0.17E-S5)  (0.SE-08)  (0.14E-27)
DICKEY-
FULLER  0.91  0.77  2.56  0.55
AUG. DICKEY-
FULLER (4)  2.76  1.50  1.90  3.97
B) CHANGE IN LOG Eb
KURTOSIS  3.07  3.34  12.00  12.61
COEFFICIENT  (O.99E-07)  (0.25E-24)  (0. 19E-293)  (0.26E-270)
SKEWINESS  0.74  0.29  1.29  0.90
COEFFICIENT  (0.86E-02)  (0.015)  (0.20E-14)  (0.34E-06)
DICKEY-
FULLER  -10.42  -17.60  -10.00  -11.06
AUG. DICKEY-
FULLER (4)  -3.60  -7.88  -3.89  -2.05
Nores:  Figures  in parentheses  are  margnai significance  levels
Source:  Basic  data obtained from USAID (1985)-56-
TABLE 8: SELECTED MONTHLY DATA ON EXCHANGE RATES
(for the mouth of devaluation  and the two months preceding and following)
CIANE  1I
DIEVALATI  DEPREATON  % CRAE  DOWEMC  S CNAJO  RUVE
YUAR  (O)  Mu3u  PttIUb  PUIMIb4  MIR.ATIN  Ot  rr  Un umu
1978 M  4  0.00  -3.23  1.85  -3.23  6.03  1.68  0.00
1978 M  S  0.00  6.90  1.98  6.90  6.03  -0.07  3.40
DEV(1)  1978 M  6  14.86  -15.20  1.46  -26.18  7.68  0.83  -6.30
1978 M  7  0.00  1.79  1.49  1.79  8.96  6.90  8.90
1978 M  8  0.00  27.27  1.89  27.27  -1.64  2.85  -8.90
1979 M  7  0.00  4.00  1.43  4.00  9.16  4.40  0.00
1979 M  8  0.00  0.57  1.44  57.00  2.72  1.84  10.40
DEV (2)  1979 M  9  25.00  74.00  2.00  39.20  3.94  0.67  -19.10
1979  M  10  0.00  -18.03  1.64  -18.03  1.76  2.22  -8.70
1979  M  11  0.00  0.83  1.65  0.83  0.06  1.78  60.40
1981 M  9  0.00  -3.77  1.89  -3.77  -13.04  5.06  -0.20
1981 .U  10  0.00  -5.36  1.79  -5.36  -5.86  1.69  -0.50
DEV (3)  1981 M  11  80.18  4.00  1.39  -22.30  -1.99  -1.88  6.40
1981 NI  12  0.00  25.93  1.03  25.93  -0.78  0.17  -13.50
1982 M  1  0.00  30.12  1.34  30.12  8.24  3.56  0.60
1982 M  9  0.00  1.45  1.61  1.45  0.31  3.77  0.10
1982 M  10  0.00  15.00  1.85  15.00  0.89  0.32  -0.20
DEV (4)  1982 M  I  44  .31  30.43  1.67  9.61  -0.60  4.80  -6.90
1982 M  12  0.00  -6.12  1.57  -6.12  -1.86  -4.20  1.70
1983 M  1  0.00  -18.33  1.28  -18.33  4.95  0.17  -2.30
1984 M  12  0.00  2.63  2.02  2.63  2.75  -1.65  0.70
1985 M  1  0.00  IS.  IS  2.33  15.15  8.96  7.62  -0.30
DEV (5)  1985 St  2  92.30  43.48  1.74  -25.39  3.87  4.81  -6.20
1985 M  3  0.00  -28.13  1.25  -28.13  5.29  1.88  -0.30
1985 Nt  4  0.00  0.00  1.25  0.00  -2.79  -0.49  -0.40
1987 h1  8  0.00  21.43  2.86  21.43  6.63  2.34  -8.50
1987 M  9  0.00  0.00  2.86  0.00  7.21  0.15  -26.30
DEV (6)  1987 M  10  80.02  7.69  1.71  7.69  -0.41  1.38  -6.20
1987 M  11  0.00  8.33  1.85  8.33  -4.47  1.29  2.10
1917 M  12  0.00  0.00  1.85  0.00  -2.18  0.91  -2.20
1988 AVG  0.00  83.45  2.65  83.4S  55.27  2.43  0.02
1989 AVG  0.00  41.55  3.82  41.55  63.46  4.55  0.32
1990 AVG  0.00  164.15  10.09  164.15  NA  NA  NA
NOTE:  19U8  MONTHLY  AVERAGE  FOR FOREIGN  RESERVES  EXCLUDES  MAY AND JUNE
ALL  FIGURES  ARE EXPRESSED  AS PERCENTAGES  EXCEPT  FOREIGN  RESERVES
CREDIT  IS DOMESTIC  CREDIT-57-
TABLE 9: EXCHANGE  RATES AND DOMESTIC  INFLATION (quarterly averages)
PERIOD  1970-73  1974-77  1978-87  1988-90
OFFICIAL  EXCHANGE RATE  0.348  0.348  1.334  4.500
BLACK  MARKET EXCHANGE  RATE  0.598  0.619  2.179  24.717
BLACK  MARKET PREMIUM  1.719  1.778  1.777  5.493
BER DEPRECIATION  (%)  1.049  0.530  9.135  21.282
OER DEVALUIATION  (S)  0.000  0.000  8.417  0.000
DOMESTIC  INFLATION  (i)  3.289  3.752  6.583  14.842
NOTES:  BLACK MARKET PREMIUM =  BERIOER
DOMESTIC INFLATION  BASED  ON CPI-58-
TABLE 10:  FISCAL ACCOUNTS  AND GOVERNMENT  FINANCE
PERIOD  1970-,3  1974-77  1978-87  1988-89
ROG DOM CREDIT  17.90  37.05  28.24  34.18
PUB SEC SliR OF
DOM CREDIT (%)  \l  58.19  64.81  6.44  65.96
RES MONEYIGDP (%)  \1  10.09  11.11  20.73  16.91
SEIGNIORAGE
CH H/rDP  (%)  \1  1.18  2.84  5.36  3.03
PRIMARY  BUDGET
DEFICrr.'GDP (%)  \2  3.43  4.45  8.73  10.53
TOTAL BUDGET
DEFICITIGDP  (M)  \2  4.31  5.84  12.96  15.87
TA:V  REVENUE/GDP (%)  14.61  13.84  12.26  8.12
FGN TAX REV/
TOTAL TAX REV (%)  '2  52.99  59.87  60.21  61.00
NOTES:  \1  FOR CALENDAR YEAR
\2  FOR FISCAL YEAR
(0) PRELIMINARY  ESTIMATES
SOURCE:  IFS DATABASE. VARIOUS BANK REPORTS-5 Q-
TABLE 11: GDP AND ITS COMPONENENTS
PERIOD  1970/71-73174  1974175-77178  1978/79-86/87  1987/88-88/89
RATE  OF  CHANGE  OF
REAL  GDP  9.30  10.69  0.78  2.75
SHARE  OF  GROSS
INVESTMENT  IN GDP  8.80  18.03  14.09  10.57
SHARE  OF PUBLIC  INVEST-
MENT  IN GROSS  INVESTMENT  NA  37.20  35.88  34.18
SHARE  OF CONSUMPTION
IN  GDP  75.79  87.72  98.09  99.28
SHARE OF PUBUC CONSUMP-
TION IN TOTAL CONSUMPTION  21.50  14.17  12.13  8.77
SHARE OF GROSS  DOMESTIC
SAVINGS  IN GDP  24.21  1.07  0.11  0.08
SHARE  OF GROSS  NATIONAL
SAVINGS IN  GDP  NA  11.14  0.59  -3.46
SHARE  OF AGRICULTURE
IN  GDP  43.90  41.68  35.33  35.00
SHARE OF INDUSTRY
IN GDP  13.98  13.68  14.31  15.00
SHARE  OF SERVICES
IN GDP  42.18  44.68  50.58  50.00
Sources:  IFS DATABASE. ANDREX AND VARIOUS  BANK REPORTS-60-
TABLE 12: EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS  (anual)
(miion  of US dollar:)
PERIOD  1970-73  1974-77  1978-87  1988-89
MATERIAL  BALCNCE  36.55  -127.85  -305.20  -521.50
OFFICIAL  WORKE
REMrrrTAcEs  7.21  152.45  338.90  294.00
DEBT  SERVICE  41.55  109.49  102.70  63.10
CURRENT  ACCOUNT
BALANCE  28.30  -231.73  -186.22  -322.15
OVERALL  BALANCE  23.60  -179.10  -224.38  252.08
CHANGE  IN RESERVES  -21.20  31.00  84.48  -49.48
NOTES.  FIGURES  FOR WORKERS  REMITTANCES  FOR 1970.72  FROM  SWAMY  (1981)
REST  FROM BANK  REPORTS  IN FISCAL  YEARS
DEBT  SERVICE  FIGURES  FROM  VARIOUS  BANK  REPORTS
ALL  OTHERS  FROM  IFS DATATABLE 13:  REAL EXCHANGE  RATE AND ITS COMPONENTS
PERIOD  1970-73  1974-77  1978-87  1988
TERMS  OF TRADE INDEX  165.24  198.33  119.51  NA
AVERAGE  EXPORT TAX RATE  0.07  0.10  0.06  0.02
AVERAGE  IMPORT TAX RATE  0.44  0.42  0.37  0.25
RATIO  OF RESOURCE
BALANCE  TO GDP  (%)  -0.34  -7.e9  -9.49  '.58
.%lRERI  70.06  73.40  128.21  NA
.MRER2  33.23  32.5  225.33  572.84
NOTES:  Terms of trade mdex from Elbaaawt  (1989)
Average export tax rate =  export tax revenuesivalue of exports
Average import  t2x rate - import tax revenues/value of imports
Both tax rates are for fiscal years.  From vrrious World Bank estimates
-MRERI  = Nontradeables  pnce indexfTradeab;es  price index
MRER2 = Noturadeables  pnce imdex/export  price index
Bae for all =  1980
Figures for 1988  are preliminary  estimates-62-
TABLE 14:  FINANCIAL VARIABLES  (annual)
PERIOD  1970-73  1974-77  1978-87  1988-89
.MIIGDP  (9)  15.06  15.78  24.89  1S.83
!l2/GDP (%)  17.22  18.57  31.94  19.99
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE  NA  NA  9.16  NA
REAL INTEREST RATE  NA  NA  -18.19  NA
WORLD NOMINAL
INTEREST  RATE  7.47  7.37  10.84  7.98
DEPRECIATION  BER (0)  3.94  2.14  38.24  62.50
NOTES:  WORLD  INTEIZEST  RATE = LIBOR  ON 3 MONTH  US DOLLAR  DEPOSITS
DOMESTIC  NOMINAL  INTEREST  RATE - 3 MONTH  DEPOSIT  RATE
REAL  INTEREST  RATE = DOMESTIC  NOMINAL  RATE - DOMESTIC  INFLATION
DOMESTIC  INFLATION  % CHANGE  IN CPI
FIGURES  FOR 1988  ONLY EXCEPT  BER DEPRECIATION
GDP FOR 1988  PRELIMARY  ESTIMATE- 63  -
TABLE  15:  MARKET  PREMIUM  AND  MACROEC(.NOMIC  PERFORMANCE(OLS:1970-88)
Dependont Variables
FrAXP  FTAXY  KFLT  KFLTDEBT  EXPGDP
REGRESSORS
Constant  1859.76  0.07  ..  ..  0.28
(3.15)  (2.33)  ..  ..  (1.58)
log GDP  62.17  0.002
(1.03)  (0.63)
Log(Eb/Eo)  -971.20  -0.04  461.26  133.36  -0.16
(-2.91)  (-2.44)  (1.09)  (3.88)  (-2.77)
log RER  -505.16  0.03
(1.34)  (1.44)
WIRATE  ..  ..  ..  87.15  5.00
(3.01)  (1.96)
Px/Pn  ..  ..  ..  ..  1.22
(3.25)
GDPlTrend GDP  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.11
(-2.29)
DUM(83-87)  -312.3  -0.01
(-2.09)  (-1.90)
DUM 85  ..  ..  ..  204.26
(5.5o)
DUM 87  ..  ..  1724.80
(4.24)
DUM  88  ..  ..  -484.94
(-1.11)
DUM(73-78)  ..  ..  ..  95.62
(4.74)
R squared  0.55  0.55  0.70  0.75  0.84
Adj. R sq.-ared  0.45  0.42  0.63  0.69  0.81
Durbin Watson  1.79  2.21  1.40  1.30  1.50-64-
Table 16: VARIANCE  RATIO STATISTICS  OF k-DIFFERENCES FOR INFLATION IN SUDAN
1970.1-1973.12  1974.1 - 1977.12.  1978.1  - 1987.12..  1988.1 - 1990.12,
I  stat,  std error  stat.  std error  stat  std erro  stat  std eor
1  1.000  0.170  1.000  0.168  1.000  0.106  1.000  0.180
5  0.204  0.08:  0.285  0.112  0.328  0.079  0.208  0.088
10  0.109  0.06$  0.165  0.192  0.201  0.070  0.111  0.072
15  0.084  0.066  0.126  0.098  0.122  0.053  0.080  0.069
20  0.045  0.045  0.092  0.089  0.084  0.043  0.061  0.067
25  0.024  0.030  0.052  0.063  0.051  0.030  0.055  0.079
30  0.028  0.043  C.J32  0.043  0.055  0.037  0.058  0.111
50  0.033  0.032
NMotes  Standard errors are computed according to Barlett  asymptotic procedure.-65-
TABLE (A.1):  EXCHANGE  RATES IN THE SUDAN
YEAR  OER  BER
1970  0.35  0.67
1971  0.35  0.61
1972  0.35  0.52
1973  0.35  0.59
1974  0.35  0.61
1975  0.35  0.67
1976  0.35  0.60
1977  0.35  0.60
1978  0.39  0.67
1979  0.45  0.74
1980  0.50  0.98
1981  0.60  1.01
1982  1.00  1.54
1983  1.30  1.82
1984  1.30  2.47
1985  2.50  3.53
1986  2.50  6.51
1987  3.00  6.48
1988  4.50  11.91
1989  4.50  17.18
1990  4.50  50.w0
Joters:  BER - Black market rate
OER - Official rat
Source:  IFS AND PICK'S CURRENCY  YEARBOOK
OFFICIAL  AND BLACK MARKET RATES ARE IN SUDANESE POUNDSIUS  S-66-
Table (A.2)
COINTEGRATION  TEST  FOR  THE  BLACK  MARKEr  EXCHANGE  RATE  PREMIUM  FOR  THE  SUDAN
(including  a ume trend)
Vanable  DF  ADF[41  Difference  DF  ADF[41
Log(q)  -3.09  -0.63  dLog(q)  -9.68  -4,25
Log(m)  -1.95  -1.51  dLog(m)  -9.39  -4.62
Log(I-tx)  -2.1  -1.8  dLog(I-tx)  -8.49  -4.35
Log(+Itm)  -2.54  -2.84  dLog(l+tm)  -8.2  -3.6
LogiC)  -3.2  -1.97  dLog(e)  -10.06  -4.39
Log(Ehat)  -4.02  -2.32  dLog(Ehat)  -9.56  -4.11
Coutegratuon
Residual  (w/o  tax)  -4.91  -2.96
Notes:
q  a  black market rate/official exchange rate
m  - broad money/official  exchange rate
tX  8export  tax rate
m=  import tanff
e  - real exchange  rate (Official Exchange rate * US WPI / Domestic CPI)
Ehat  =  expected devaluaoionFig  1: BLACK  MARKET  PREMIUM
IN THE SUDAN
Premium





1.00  _J_I._  I  _I  _.l  f 
1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990
YearFIG 2:  BLACK MARKET  EXCI-IANGE  RATE










11/04/84  11/14/84  12/02/84  12/16/84  01/02/05  01/19/85  02/06/85
DATE
13  BEROt  u  e0  U  a  S  0D  et  at  o  a  9  I
7_  ,  ,  ,  _  ,  0oo-  OR _-  -_o
..  .,,,,  ,,,,  ,,,  ,,  ...  ,  000  .__.__.__.__.,  ___-we_
.......  - 00
~~~.  ..  b  -..  ...........  ...  ......  ..  ooo
.........  ,  *  ..... 0  ..  --  0 of  0
of  0
060  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  00
005  0
.08  . 005
0t IHX
0-99t61  £9-9tL1
03  a  a  at  9  a  cC  a  as  a  a  I  I
______________________  . .. ~ot  - --  - --  ---- V  - - --  - . - -------  0200
010
000~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~6
i  . ..  . . . . - . . O
LL4L6L  CL-OLSLOr
NVGflS  ~Ii  NI NOLV1JNOslo
SEIONUEldJIO-~~~~~~I  JO SOIISIiVIS  OILVU  ElONVIUVA~~~~~~~~e 0c  enliFig 4: Inflation in Suidan





0  I  ,
1978  1979 1980  1981 1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Year
Actual  '  Threshold
Threshold  is weighted  by the ratio of
M2(Q4)  to M2(quarterly,  averaged)  to
annualize  the estimation  In the text.- 71 -
RefurIn3ec
Ali, t. Ali (1988), "On Reform Policies and Capital Flight," (in Arabic).  A
paper presented to the Conference on Reform Policies and Development in
the Arab World, Kuwait, February 1988.
Ali, A. All (1985) (ed)  The Sudan Economy in Disarray  (Khartoum:  Ali A. Ali
Publishers)
Awad, H. M. (1982), "Wrong Recipes, Bad Results," Sudanow (Khartoum:  Ministry
of Culture and Information).
Blanchard, Olivier J., and M. Watoon (1982), Bubbles, Rational Expectations,
and Financial Markets," Working Paper No. 945.  Cambridge, Mass.
N.B.E.R., July.
Brown, R. (1986), "International Response to Sudan's Economic Crisis:  1978 to
the April 1985 Coup d'Etat'," Develoyment and Chance, Vol.17, No. 3,
487-511.
Brown, R.  (1988) "A background Note on the Final Round of Economic Austerity
Moasures Imposed by the Nimeiry Regime:  June 1984-March 1985," Ln
Barnett and Abdel Karim (ede) (1988).
Barnett, T. and Abdel Karin, A. (eds). (1988) Sudan:  State. Caital  and
Transformation (London:  Croom Helm).
Brown, R. (1989), "The Rationale and Effects of the IMF Stabilization
Programme in Sudan," in Bonnie K. Campbell (ed.) Political Dimensions of
the International Crlis$ (MacMillan).
Cochrane, J., (1988), "How Big is the Random Walk in CNP?",  JPE, 96, pp. 893-
920, October.
CuOdington, John T., (1986) "Capital Flight:  Estimates, Issues, and
Explanations," Princetont  Studies in International Finance," No. 58
(Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton University).
de Macedo J. (1985), "The Free Foreign Exchange Market in Sudan:  Description
and Analysis,"  (Draft).
Devarajan, Shantayanan and R. Weiner (1990), "Why the Sandinistas Lost:
Coffee, Hyperinflation, and the Black Market for Foreign Exchange in
Nicaragua,"  A  paper  presented  at  the  North-East  Development  Economic
Conference,  Yale  University,  May.
Dixit, Avinash (1985), "Optimal  Trade  and  Industrial  Policies  for  the  US
automobile Industry," (draft), Princeton University, August.
Dornbusch, Rudiger  (1985),  "External Debt, Budget Deficits and Disequilibrium
Exchange Rates," in G.W.  Smith  and J.T. Cuddington  (eds) internatLonal
Debt and The Develo0ino Countries, Washington, The World Bank.- 72 -
Dorlibusch,  Rudiger (1986), *Special Exchange Rates for Capital Transactions",
The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 3-33.
Dornbusch, Rudiger and others (1983), "The Black market for Dollars  in
Brazil," Q=,  February.
Elbadawi, Ibrahim  (1987), "Foreign Trade and Exchange Rate Policy and Their
Long-Term  Impact  on  Sudanese Agriculture,"  Prepared  for the USAID/SUDAN.
Elbadawi,  Ibrahim  (1989), "The  Extent and  Conuequences  of  Direct  and  Indirect
Taxation  of  Sudanese  Agriculture,"  Prepared  for  the  USAID/SUDAN.
Engle,  Robert  and Clive Granger  (1987),  "Co-Integration  and  Error-Correction:
Representation, Estimation, and Testing," Econometrica,  55,  pp.  251-276.
Hussein, M.N. (1985)," IMF Economics in the Sudan:  A preliminary Evaluation,"
in  Ali,  A.  Ali  (1985)  (eds.).
_ (1988), "The IMF and Sudanese Economic Policy," in
Barnett and .. bdel K&rin  (eds) (1988).
Hussain, M. N. and A. P. Thirwall (1984),"  The IMF Supply-side Approach *3
Devaluation:  An  Assessment with Reference to the Sudan,"  -oxfgrd
Bulletin of Economies and Statistics, Vol. 46, No. 2:  145-67.
Kaminsky, G. (1988), "The Real Exchange Rate Since Floating:  Market
Fundamentals or Bubbles?," Unpublished Manuscripts University of
California, San  Diego.
Kiguel, Miguel A. and J. Saul Lizondo (1988), "Adoption and Abandonment of
Dual Exchange Rate Systems," DRD Discussion Paper No. 201, The World
Bank.
Lizondo, J. Saul (1987a) "Exchange Rate Differential and Balance of Payments
Under Dual Exchange Markets," Journal of DeveloDmert Economics.
Lizondo J. Saul (1987b), "Unification of Dual Exchange Markets,"  Jogrnal of
International Economics.
Meese, Richard (1986), "Testing for Bubbles in Exchange Markets:  A case for
Sparkling Rates?" JPE, Vol. 94,  No. 2, pp.345-373.
Nashashibi, K. (1980),"  A Supply Framework for Exchange Reform in Developing
Countries:  The Experience of Sudan," IMF Staff Pavers, 27 (March): 24-
79.
Pastor, M. (1990),  "Capital  Fligyht  from  Latin America," World Development,
Vol. 18, No. 1,  pp.1-18.
Pinto, Brian (1987), "Exchange Rate Unification and Budgetary Policy in Sub-
Saharan Africa," mimeo, The World Bank.- 73  -
Pinto, Brian (1988a), "Black Markets for Foreign Exchange, Real Exchange Rates
and Inflation:  Overnight vs. Gradual Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa,"
mimeo, World Bank, revised May.
Pinto, Brian (1988b), "Black Market Premia, Exchange Rate Unification, and
Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa," mimeo, The World Bank.
Pinto, Brian and Sweder van Wijnbergen (1987), "Exchange Rate Regimes in
Africa", mimeo, The World Bank.
USAID (1985)  "The Free Foreign Exchange Rate Market in Sudan," USAID/SUDAN.
Umbadda, Siddiq (1986), "Liberalization of Trade and Payments in the Sudan,
1979-1985," in EmRlovment and Economic Reform, DSRC, University of
Khartoum, August.
Umbadda, Siddiq (1984), 'Import Policy in the Sudan," University of Khartoum,
DSRC Monooraph Series No.  17.- 74  -
,^FPENDDE:S- 75 -
ApPUDNDA  I
A RECENT HISTORY OF EXCHNGE  RATR AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES IN THE SUDAN
Throughout  its  recent  history  the Sudan's  foreign  trade  and payment
regime  has  generally  been  characterized  by exchange  controls,  import
restrictions  and fixed  multiple  exchange  rates.  The  import  control  took
various  forms  such  as  hirh tariff  rates,  tight  licencing,  or altogether
banning  of certain  categories  of imports. This  regime  has  maintained  itself
and  even much  of its  details  since  the Sudan's  independence  in 1956  up to the
last  year of the 5eventies  decade when the country ushered into a new era of
foreign  trade  and  exchange  libei  ilization  attempts  in  September  1979.
Recurrent  balance  of payment  difficulties  - tespite  the controls  - and
the emerging  importance  of the remittances  from  Sudanese  national  working
abroad  (SNWA)  have  prompted  the  authorities  at attempting  changes  in the  above
system  well before  the  end  of the  seventies  decade.  By the early  seventies
special  import  arrangements  and  more  depreciated  exchange  rate and subsidy
schemes  were introduced  for  SNWA  remittances  and nontraditional  exports,  while
reliance  on Gxchange  control  and  import  restrictions  continued  for the  rest  of
the  economy. The seventies  have in fact  been  a transitional  period  for  the
Sudanese  foreign  trade  and  payment  regime  with  SNWA  remittances  playing  the
major  role  in  shaping  this  transition.  The  attempts  at  enhancing  the  flow  of
these  remittances  through  the  official  channels  while  at the same time
segmenting  the  SNWA sector  from  the  rest  of the economy  however  did not
succeed.
The  expansive  macroeconomic  policies  adopted  during  the period  have
aggravated  the already  tenuous  foreign  sector  position  and facilitated  the
expansion  of the black  market  which  attracted  the lion  share  of SNWA- 76 -
remittances.  Finally the authorities accepted the IMF-inspired stabilization
and liberalization package in September 1979.  The proposea packa'e was
composed  of  devaluation  of the  Sudanese  pound  vis-a-via  the US dollar  with an
eye  on a gradual  move towards  a complete  unification  of the exchange  rate  and
elimination  of the  multiple  rate  6ystem. On the import  side,  the policy  also
calls  for  a  gradual  move  towards  trade  liberalization.  The  quest  for
liberalization  in the  Sudan  has  been a dismal  failure. With unsustainable
macroeconomic  policies,  the  experiment  has  widely  exposed  the credibility
problem  of  the government,  thus  rekindling  expectation  and  w.idening  the
parallel  market. After  a decade  long  of liberalization  attempts,  Sudan  now
has  moved full  circle  back  to total  import  bans and  exchange  control  enforced
by harsh  measures  including  the  death  penalty. 0
1.1  The  Pro - September 1979 Period
As we mentioned  above,  the  Sudan's  import  and  payment  regime  started  as
a  strict  import  against  payment  system. According  to this arrangement  all
foreign  exchange  proceeds  from  exports  and  invisibles  should  be surrendered  to
the  Bank  of Sudan  at the  official  exchange  rate  which  has been fixed  at LS.35
per  US dollar.  Imports  which  are  classified  by type  of importers:
government,  industrial  sector  and  commercial  private  sector  imports;  are
usually  subjected  to tight  licensing  and  with the later  group  of imports  being
the  most affected. AP the  foreiqn  sector  gap  worsened  during  the seventies
these  controls  were  more  rigorously  enforced  by the  authorities. In  view of
3In  an attempt  to enforce  economic  controls,  especially  foreign  exchange
controls,  the  current  military  regime  in  Sudan  which  took  power  in  June  30,  1989;
have so far  executed  two alleged  violators  in addition  to others  who received
harsh  jail  and  other  punishments.- 77 -
the  rather  inelastic  demand  for  imports  in  the  Sudan  (with  an  estimated  import
price  elasticity  of -. 40,  Elbadawi  (1987))  it  in not  surprising  to  so*
increasing  reliance  on quantitative  restrictions  of imports  as a  means  to
addressing  the foreign  exchange  crisis. The  persistence  of consecutive
deficits  in  the  balance  of payments  however  amply  demonstrated  the
ineffectiveness  of the  above  system. Umbadda (1964)  observes  that:  there
were  deficits  in the SOP  for  more  than 15 consecutive  years (with  the
exception  of small  surplus  of LS  1.6  million  is 1969  and  LS 9  million  in
1973). Since  the mid-seventies,  the  deficits  in the SOP  developed  Into  a
major  foreign  exchange  gap.
1.  The  Dual  Rate System: 1972  - 1979.
By the  early seventies  the  authorities  introduced  a  dual exchange  rate
system  and  a  new  import  arrangements  as  part  of  a  policy  designed  to tap  the
foreign  exchange  resources  of SNWA  in order  to finance  much needed  Imports  an
well  as to encourage  export  diversification  through  promotion  of marginal
exports. The  details  of such  policies  are contained  in table (1).  In 1972
and  exchange  rate  subsidy  was  established  which  raised  the  effective  exchange
rate  applicable  to all  transactions  (except  cotton  and  gum  Arabic,  two  of
Suaans main  exports)  to LS.40/USS. On May 1975,  gum  Arabic  exports  were
moved  to the  effective  rAte  with cotton  exports  still  traded  under  the lower
official  rate.  rn 1978,  and  a& a  part of an agreement  with the IMP,  the
official  rate  was devalued  by 13%  te rise  to LS 0.40/USs. Cotton  was
therefore  transacted  at  the new  depreciated  rate of LS 0.40/USS.
In recognition  of the increasing  importance  of (SNWA)  in  terms  of their
remittance  funds  and  apparent  long-term  stability  of the flow  of these  funds,- 78 -
a  premium  rate  has  been  set  to  encourage  the  transaction  of these  funca
through  official  banking  channels. In  July 1973  the premium  rate  was set  at
LS 0.45/USS,  to be raised  to LS 0.56/USS  in  January  1974.  In July 1977  the
premium  remained  at this  level  until  March  27, 1979,  when it rose  to LS
0.  67/US$.
On the  import  side  two  new  Import  systeme  were introc-__dt  the  'nil-
value,  and town-barter'.  This  new  system,  seen  as supportive  to the itill
main  system  of  'import  and  payments',  was  designed  in  such  a  way  so  that  .t
may  not  effect  foreign  exchange  to be officially  surrendered. 'Town-barter'
which  is defended  as an export  promotion  policy  is supposed  to te  financed  by
50%  of export  proceeds  of marginal  exports  while  the  other  50% is to be
surrendered  to the  authorities  at the  official  exchange  rate.  The 'nil-value'
system  on the  other  hand,  were  to be financed  from  the savings  of the (SNWA).
On the  positive  side,  the  town-barter'  has  proven  to be on effective  export
promotion. Also  the 'nil-value'  has  managed  to assume  an increasing  role  in
financing  imports,  see  table (3).  Despite  attempts  at enforcing  the
segmentating  of this  new import  and  payment  system  from  the  main official
payment  and  trade  regime,  the new  system  has  generated  an increased  flow
demand  for  foreign  exchange.
By  the last  quarter  of the 70's  d'  -ade,  the depreciation  in the  black
market  rate  started  to rise,  see  table (1). The  more depreciated  rate  in the
black  market,  has in  turn helped  to accelerate  the  diversion  of SNWA
remittances  to the  black  market,  and  mis-invoica.ng  of exports  and imrorts  in
the  official  market. Therefore  the  unintended  effects  of the new  policy  have
been  to increase  the leakage  from  the  official  market  to the  dual market  and
increased  role  for  the  black  market  for  foreign  exchange  and less  SNWA- 79  -
remittances  through  the  official  market.
1.2  -2.berali.ation  Attempts  1979-1985
Septen'oer  1979  marked  the beginning of what came to be known as the
'liberalizatiuns  era'  of the Sudan's  foreign  trade  and  payment  regime. This
liberalization  has  been  a part  of a more  general  economic  reform  strategy
inspired by the IMF  and other multilateral ag&acies. 3 1  The main objective. of
thia strategy  are  to remove  price  distortions  deemed  to be biased  against
exportables  and in favor  of excessive  importing. The  proposed  package  is
composed  of devaluation-  and gradual  steps  towards  complete  unification  of
exchange  rates. On the  trade  side  the  policy  also calls  for  gradual  move
towards  trade liberalization  through  dismantling  of administrative  import
control  measures  and  giving  more 4hance  to tariffs  and the newly  set
'scarcity'  value for  foreign  exchange  to rationalize  imports. The central
policies  adopted  by the  authovities  in  this regard  were two folds:  successive
devaluations  and continuous  3hifting  of import  categories  from  the official
market  of  foreign  exchange  to the  parallel  market. Below  we will provide  a
detailed  description  of these  developments,  the  major  episodes  are recorded  in
table  (1)  below.
2.  initial  Liberalization  :  Seo. 1979 -June  1981
As we mentioned  earlier,  July 1978  witnessed  the first  official
devaluation  when the  currency  was devalued  by 13 percent. The  major shake  to
the  system  however,  took  place  in  mid September  1979  when foreign  exchange
32For  more details  on IMF stabilization  in Sudan, see Ali  (1985),  Awad
(1982),  Brown (1986,  1988, 1989),  Hussain (1985,  1988),  Hussain and Thirwall
(1984),  and  Nashashibi  (1980).- Su  -
cont-o3lc  were abolished and possession of foreign exchange by Sudanese
nationals war allowed.  Transactions in foreign exchange however, were limited
to a group of authorized banks in addition to the Bank of Sudan (8OS).  Also
the 'nil value' system of the previous period was abolished as it is being
dismissed as disruptive and blamed for fueling the rise in the black market
premium.  Despite the abolishing of the 'nil  value' system, dealings in
foreign exchange continued.  And instead of declining, the black market
premium remained high after the devaluation in each of the two official dual
rates.  Legalizing of foreign exchange possession has the effect of bringing
the dealings in foreign exchange from its off-shore markets tO  inside tne
country in  what come to be known the "street markets".
A  dual rate system was created with official rate set at LS .50/USS  and
a  parallel rate set at LS .80/USS, see table (1).  On the trade side all major
exports were to be transacted in the official market  (94% of all exports), and
also some of the more important imports (56%).  As the policy of successively
moving imports from the official to the parallel market continued only 10
commodities were imported through the official market by September 1980; the
list  was further shortened in June 1981 when key imports such as pesticides,
fertilizers, and all agricultural inputs were transferred to the parallel
market.  Some key import commodities, however,  (wheat, flour, sugar,
pharmaceutical, petroleum products, and milk powder) remained :a  the official
market which is now financed by 50% of exports receipts (i.e. commercial banks
were asked to surrender this).
On the export side marginal exports were traded in the parallel market
since its inception.  Moreover comp ate or partial retention of foreign
exchange proceeds from these exports are allowed to be used to finance- 81  -
imports. Major  exports  however  were  moved  to the parallel  market  only  after  a
considerable  lag,  especially  for  cotton  and  gum arabic,  two of Sudan's  major
exports. It  took one  year since  September  1979  before  all exports  except
cotton  were  transferred  to the  parallel  market,  and  nearly  one  more year
before  cotton  was finally  transferred.
3.  Leaalized  Free Market:  July 1981  - April  1983.  Jan 1984 - Jan 1985
The  high flow  demand  for imports  and  the  underlying  macroeconomic
conditions  ensured  the  continued  expansion  of the black (free)  market  of
foreign  exchange  in  order  to clear  both aeset  and flow  transactions  while  the
premium  remained  high.  The  persistence  of these  phenomena  despite  enforcement
efforts  by the authorities,  paved  the  way for  a major  liberalization  measures.
By  July 1981  the 'Black  market*  was legalized  and  dealings  in foreign
exchange  was  to be conducted  in  private  foreign  exchange,  bureaus (serafas)
that  are  directly  supervised  by the  BOS.  Effective  November  9th 1981,  the
official  and  parallel  exchange  rate  were unified  (i.e.  devaluation)  at LS 0.9
to  the USS.
On  the  import  side  three  quarters  of  non-cotton  exports,  proceeds,  all
cotton  proceeds  and  government  Importe  (petroleum  and  major  food  imports),
were  to  be  valued  at  the  official  unified  rate.  The  remainder  of  Imports  are
to  be  valued  at  the  free  rate  and  totally  or  partially  financed  by  foreign
exchange  obtained  from  private  exchange  houses.  This  policy  led  to
considerable  discretion  being  accorded  to  Bank  managers  in deciding  on
decisions  regarding  whether  or not  to finance  imports  using banks,  resources.
Given  the  extent  of excess  flow  demand  for  foreign  exchange,  this arrangement
triggered  enormous  rLnt-seeking  practices,  Usbadda  (1986).  icost  of  import- 82  -
demands  however  still  have  to be cleared  through  the free  market.  Thus  the
free  rate continued  to increaue  reaching  1.42  by mid June 1982,  table (1).
Private  dealers  in  the  mean  time  were subjected  to intense  pressure  by
the  Minister  of Finance  to bring  down  the free  rate into  more 'acceptable 
levels  - shortly  after  the  dealers  declared  their inability  to bring  down  the
rate in  June 19,  1986;  the  authorities  moved  by setting  a maximum  selling  and
buying,  rate  of  LS  1.15/S  and  LS 1.13/S  respectively. This move however  did
not  only  prove  to be ineffective  but  also  counter  productive  since  it  led  to
the  re-emergence  of the  black  market  which  already  started  since  private
dealers  attempted  to  set  an 'accepted'  rate  for the free  rate.  More
importantly  the  move  by  the  government  seems  to  have  shaken  perception  about
government  credibility  and  commitment  to  the  reforms,  a  matter  that  led  to  the
creation  of  a  rent  seeking  group  of  'trusted'  middlemen,  "through  whom
customers  (citizens,  private  sector  and some  times  even  government  units)
would  charnel  their  demands  for  foreign  exchange  for  a  premium,"  USArD (1985).
As  a  result  the  authorities  were  forced  to  rescind  the  mearure  of  fixing
the  market  rate  for  foreign  exchange  in  August  1982.  In  November  1982  the
unified  official  rate  was  devalued  to LS 1.30/S,  and in  November  1983  the
policy  of  unified  official  rate  was abandoned  with a creation  of a dual
crawling  peg  set  at LS 1.75/S. Foreign  exchange  dealings  with this  rate
started  with  four  licenced  commercial  banks.  The  number  of  licensed  banks
increased  to  12  and  the  rate  reached  LS  1.8/S  by March  l983.  On the  trade
side,  75%  of exports  were transacted  through  the official  market (LS  1.3/$)
and  25% at  the  dual official  market  (LS  1.8/$). For imports  however  an import
priority  list  of a few  essential  goods  were  to be financed  by the dual
official  market. This  effectively  left  most  of imports  to be financed  by the- 83 -
free  market. This neo  policy  certainly  implied  a bias  against  exports  since
it forced  their  transacting  through  the two  official  markets.  But it  also
expanded  the  current  account  link  of  the  free  market  a  matter  which  led  to  an
even  more depreciating  free  rate.
About  mid  May 1983,  the authorities  abolished  the free  market  by
revoking  the  licenses  of the private  dealers  who  were accused  to have  engaged
into  the  harmful  practices  of  hoarding  foreign  exchange.  In addition  to this
major  reversal  on  the  payment  side,  imports  were  restricted  and  by July 1983,
39  import  items  were  banned.  As  black  market  re-emerged  to  replace  the  former
free  legal  mar%st  with  the  commercial  banks  unable  to  achieve  any  gains  due to
their  lower  administered  rates;  the  free  market  was legalized  and private
dealers  were  allowed  to operate  again  starting  January  1984.  This  phase
(January  1984-January  1985)  was characterized  by a vastly  depreciating  rate in
the re-legalized  free  market,  see  table (1).
rn an apparent  attempt  to improve  incentives  for  export  the auth3rities
moved  all  exports  (except  cotton  and  gum  Arabic)  to the parallel  official
market. With  the free  rate  depreciating  so largely  thie  move did not have  a
big  effect  either  in  terms  of export  expansion  or reducing  mis-invoicing  or
smuggling  of exports. By January  1985,  the  Minister  of Finance  asked  the
dealers  to reduce  the  free  rate  which reached  a  ecord  level  of LS 3.75/S.
Just as before  attempts  by the dealers  to fix  or reduce  the rate failed  and
the  black  rate  rocketed  to LS 4.90/S  in February  6, 1985,  the  day which
witnessed  the closing  down  of private  dealership  and  subsequently  all foreign
exchange  transactions  were confined  to licenued  commercial  bAnks.  Foreign
exchange  held  bl the  private  dealers  were collected  by the authorities  and  was
put  at the control  of the  BOS.  Private  dealers  were offered  the choice- 84 -
between using  their  foreign  exchange  for importing  goods  of their  choice
(subject  to the approval  of the  Ministry  of Commerce)  or receiving  its
equivalent  in domestic  currency  according  to the prevailing  dual  official
rate,  USAID (1985).
4.  Ouasi-leaalized  Free  Market: Februarv  1985-June  1989.
The beginning  of this  phase  is  marked  by a devaluation  of the two  rates
in  February  1985.  With  the  official  set  at LS 2.50/5  and the  dual at
LS 3.30/S.  The dual  market  rate  was to  be reviewed  periodically  by a bankers'
Association  committee. Between  February  1985  to April 1987  this  rate ranged
between  LS 25/S  to  LS 4.00/S  while  the  black  market  ranged  between  LS 3.7/S
to  LS 5.8/S.
All exports  and  government  imports  are  transacted  at the  official  rate.
This leaves  the rest  of the  imports  to be transacted  at the dual  rate.  The
black  market  rate  continued  to be high and  depreciating  despite  the successive
tightening  of import  restrictions  with the list  of banned  imports  extended  to
100  items  by  1986.  The  flow  demand  for  foreign  exchang(  contirued  high  to
finaiice  smuggling,  capital  flight  etc.  In  October  1987,  an  official
devaluation  and attempted  unification  of the two rates  brought  the  unified
rate  at LS 4.5/S. Also  an "own  resouree"  import  system  was introduced. One
year later  in  October  1988  the  dual rate  was set  at LS 11.30/S  and later
increased  to LS 12.10/S.
The sizable  devaluation  of the  dual rate in  October  1988,  which  set  the
dual  rate equal  to the  black  market  rate  prevailing  at the  time achieved  some
modest  success  in  enhancing  the  transfer  of SNWA  remittances  through  the
official  channels  and  the  black  market  premium  declined  but  was not completely- 85  -
eliminated  however. Up to 1989  the  black  market  though  illegal  but largely
tolerated  and as such  quasi-legalized  and its links  to SNWA remittances  and
'own  resource'  imports  continued  unimpeded. During  the first  six  months  of
1989  however,  the authorities  attempted  to step up enforcement  measures.  This
led  to a jump  in the  black  market  rate  to LS 20/5  by June 1989  as the
perceived  risk  has risen.
S.  Policy  Reversal: July 1989-Preosent.
The  current  military  regime  in  Sudan  started  off  with  a  maasivo  campaign
aimed  at  weedig  out  the  black  market,  not  by  economic  means  however,  but
almost  exclusively  through  "policing  the economy". Harsh  measures  were
deployed  to entorce  the  price  and foreign  exchange  control,  much  as
confiscation  of goods,  long  term  prison  terms  and  even execution  in the  case
of illegal  holding  of foreign  exchange.
Despite  their  rigor  of enforcement,  these  measures  were once again  not
successful. In fact  their  impact  on business  confidence  and  remittance  flows
has  been  much more  devastating  than  any  previous  enforcement  attempts. The
black  market  exchange  rate has  now  reached  LS 25 per  US dollar,  severe
shortages  ensued  and  the  black  market  is still  quite  pervasive. The
remittances  transferred  through  the  official  channels  are  expected  to decline
by about  20%  this fiscal  year  despite  the strong  onforcement  measures.- 86 -
bPENpIX  1I
A  MET=ODOLOGY  FOR COMPUTING  CAPITAL rLIGHT  IN  SUDAN
Do,nbusch  (1985)  defines  capital  flight  as that  part  of the increase  in
gross  external  debt  that is  not  utilized  to finance  current  account  deficit
net  of direct  and long-term  portfolio  capital  inflows,  or to finance  official
reserve  increases. According  to this  view  capital  flight  is identified  with
net  private  short-run  capital  outflow. For  the  case  of the  Sudan  our  measure
of  the current  account  must include  the  unreported  currant  account  of the
private  sector,  otherwise  our  estimates  may substantially  understata  the  true
magnitude  of capital  flight. We do this  by adding  the  unreported  current
account  deficit  (which  is large  and  negative)  to the following  identity:
Increase  in  Gross  External  Debt
(net  of amortization  and interest  payment)  - (Official  Current  Account  Deficit
*  Unreported  Private
Current  Acc. Deficit
- Direct and long-term
Portfolio  Capital  inflows)
+  Reserves  Increases
+  Capital  Flight
where  unreported  current  account  deficit  is  measured  an the negative  of the
excess  of  SNWA  remittances  channeled  through  the  black  market  over  the  value
of imports  financed  by own importer's  resources. These  imports  are  reported
and legal  but  they  are  not inc.uded  in the  official  current  account. Also  the
i:rrease  in  external  debt is adjusted  for  amortization  and interest  payment  in
order  to exclude  the capitalization  of interest  on arrears  from  the- 87 -
measurement  of the increase  of debt.  rnelusion  of the capitalized  interests
on  arrears  --  which  are  substantial  in  the  case  of Sudan,  has  the effect  of
artificially  exagerating  the  meavtue  of capital  flight.
The  corresponding  estimates  of capital  flight  are  contained  in table  (4)
(column  (1)). Even though  our  estimates  of capital  flight  do not include  mis-
invoiced  transactions  on exports  and  imports  (including  smuggling),  as  well as
expenditurc  on travel,  education,  etc.  abroad,  they nonetheless  capture  the
main items  in  the  credit  and  debt  sides  of the  unreported  current  account,
namely  the  flow  of remittances  through  the  black  market  and  the 'own
resources'  imports. Still,  however,  thece  estimates  can  only provide  an
approximate  view  of the  extent  of capital  flight  in the  Sudan.  Another  set  of
estimates  for  capital  flight  in  the  Sudan  were computed  ln  Ali (1988). These
estimates  were  obtained  as balancing  residuals  in  the identity  which  sets
resource  mobilization  equal  to their  utilization. Even  though  Ali's  number
are  higher  than  ours,  both  estimates,  however,  reflect  the same  pattern  of
increasing  capital  flight  over  time.- 88 -
APPzNDIS III
SXPEcTED  LEVML  OF Tax  NOMINAL OFFICIAL  EXcHANGE  RA=t
(A.23')  L.EOGS  - 4.62*  +  1.25  log  q, (4.77)
(0 52) log q.1 +  (133)  1log  qe- 2
+  0.76  log83  log.  0.8
(2.72) log q3  +(955)  ogm
0  .97  log  ec  +  2  80  log  et-2 (1.74)  C  (5.32)
*0.59  A l  og  Ho,+  2.92  A log E4,
(1.51)  (6b48)
*2.69  A log  E,.  - 0.13  lgE, (3.81)  l  e.z  (-0.26)  log  B0
0 .55  A log  0Eo- (1.31)
R2 0.91,  R2 =  0.89,  DW=  0.  67
*  The  constant  term is adjusted  for  non-normality  of  the  disturbance  term  by the
factor  (03  /2)  1/  =  0.  059  ,  where  P 3 is  the third  moment  of  the
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